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NEED FOR PAY FOR SUCCESS PROGRAMS TO 
HOUSE FORMERLY INCARCERATED PEOPLE 
Eva Coruzzi Schneider* 
“As a society, our decision to heap shame and contempt upon those who 
struggle and fail in a system designed to keep them locked up and locked out 
says far more about ourselves than it does about them.”** 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is home to less than five percent of the world’s total 
population, yet houses nearly twenty-five percent of the world’s prison 
population.1  Almost one-third of Americans have a criminal record.2  For 
the past twelve years, an average of 650,000 people have been released 
annually from federal and state prisons.3  Over ninety-five percent of people 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis [https://perma.cc/
AE9U-346G]. 
 2. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON 
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY 
PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 1 (Apr. 4, 2016), 
[hereinafter HUD GUIDANCE 2016] https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?
id=HUD_OGCGuidAppFHAStandCR.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM5C-WD98]. 
 3. See id. at 1. 
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currently incarcerated in state prisons will be released at some point in the 
future.4  Where will they live? 
This issue has especially impacted Black communities throughout the 
United States.  Indeed, Black Americans are vastly overrepresented in the 
American prison system:  1 million of the 2.3 million people currently 
incarcerated are Black Americans.5  Statistically, Black Americans make up 
13.3 percent of the total population of the United States yet comprise 37.8 
percent of the federal incarcerated population.6  In other words, Black 
Americans are incarcerated at “nearly three times their proportion of the 
general population.”7 
For many formerly incarcerated people, the pathway to reentering society 
is fraught with obstacles.  One substantial barrier is obtaining access to safe, 
secure, and affordable housing—an integral step for successful reentry.8  
This is particularly true for formerly incarcerated people of color.  
Historically, the federal government supported state-sanctioned segregation 
and created stringent policies to keep formerly incarcerated people of color 
out of white neighborhoods and public housing.9  However, under the Obama 
Administration, the federal government generated regulations and guidance 
under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) to combat housing discrimination that 
formerly incarcerated people face. 
The FHA prohibits discrimination in housing based on “race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”10  In 2013, the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) issued a regulation that 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (last revised Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/reentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF3W-3NCV]; HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra 
note 2, at 1. 
 5. See Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-
fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/484F-TCNX]. 
 6. See Inmate Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (last updated Mar. 25, 2017), 
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp [https://perma.cc/936M-
XCRJ]; Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045215/00#headnote-js-a [https://perma.cc/7FAJ-R25U]. 
 7. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3. 
 8. See Jocelyn Fontaine & Jennifer Biess, Housing as a Platform for Formerly 
Incarcerated Persons, WHAT WORKS COLLABORATIVE, URB. INST. 1 (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412552-Housing-as-a-
Platform-for-Formerly-Incarcerated-Persons.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE23-8P5Z]. 
 9. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ 
[https://perma.cc/XWZ6-J37S] (explaining that the federal government in the 1950s only 
distributed funding to segregated housing projects); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. 
DEV., “ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” POLICY IN PUBLIC HOUSING, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF A 
ONE STRIKE POLICY 5 (Mar. 1996), [hereinafter HUD, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT] in HUD 
Directive No. 96-16 (Apr. 12, 1996). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
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formalized a three-part burden-shifting test11 to prove disparate impact 
liability under the FHA.12  Under this regulation, a practice has a 
discriminatory effect if it actually, or predictably, will result in a disparate 
impact on a protected group.13  In 2015, the Supreme Court recognized the 
disparate impact liability theory based on its interpretation of the FHA in 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc.14  However, the Court limited the application of 
disparate impact claims brought under the FHA by enacting certain 
“safeguards” that apply at the pleadings stage, making establishing a prima 
facie case more challenging.15  Also in 2015, HUD issued guidance to Public 
Housing Authorities (“PHAs”) and owners of federally assisted housing, 
prohibiting the use of arrest records as a basis for denying admission, 
terminating assistance, or evicting tenants from federally subsidized 
housing.16  In 2016, HUD issued further guidance to detail how the disparate 
impact test applied to formerly incarcerated people.17  HUD recognized that 
having a criminal record is not a protected characteristic under the FHA, but 
that criminal record barriers to housing disproportionately affect racial and 
ethnic minorities.18  According to this guidance, an individual who is 
discriminated against on the basis of her past criminal conviction may bring 
a disparate impact claim against a housing provider19 if she can prove “that 
the [housing provider’s] policy results in a disparate impact on a group of 
persons because of their race or national origin.”20  This guidance does not 
detail the limitations established by the Court in Texas v. Inclusive 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See infra Section I.E. 
 12. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. 
 13. See id. § 100.500(a). 
 14. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2507 (2015). 
 15. See infra Section I.E. 
 16. See GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLY-
ASSISTED HOUSING ON EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN HOUSING DECISIONS 2 
(Nov. 2, 2015), [hereinafter HUD GUIDANCE 2015] http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=PIH2015-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WP-7G3W] (explaining that 
arrest records alone cannot be used as a basis for denying housing; PHAs have discretion to 
consider circumstances; HUD does not require “one strike” policies; PHAs must ensure that 
applicants’ and tenants’ due process rights are upheld; and that all policies must be in 
compliance with the FHA, Americans with Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
the Rehabilitation Act). 
 17. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3-4, 7. 
 18. See id. at 2. 
 19. The Fair Housing Act, in some circumstances, exempts owner-occupied buildings that 
have four or fewer units, single family housing that is rented or sold without a broker, and 
housing that is operated by private clubs and religious organizations that restrict occupancy 
to members only. See Fair Housing–It’s Your Right, DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/FHLa
ws/yourrights [https://perma.cc/5DM3-GA5T]; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b), 3606, and 3607(a). 
 20. HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3; see infra Section I.E. 
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Communities.21  As a result, the more plaintiff-friendly HUD guidance and 
regulations and the more defendant-friendly 2015 decision by the Court are 
in tension and may result in conflicting outcomes in the future.22 
This Note argues that disparate impact litigation alone is insufficient to 
provide formerly incarcerated people access to safe, affordable, and stable 
housing.  Even with the HUD regulations and guidance and the Court’s 
recent recognition of the disparate impact theory under the FHA, the current 
litigation model is ineffective for four reasons.  First, over the past forty 
years, plaintiffs have experienced limited success litigating disparate impact 
claims.  Second, the more stringent pleading requirements (or “safeguards”) 
outlined in Texas v. Inclusive Communities will only make it more 
challenging for plaintiffs to initiate successful disparate impact claims.  
Third, litigation is a slow, time-consuming, and expensive process that can 
impede disadvantaged individuals from bringing claims.  Lastly, the most 
recent appointment on the Supreme Court, the single party dominance of the 
executive and legislative branches, and the appointment of Ben Carson as 
HUD Secretary23 will likely undercut the efficacy of disparate impact 
litigation over the coming years.  Ultimately, litigation alone is ill-equipped 
to accommodate the large volume of housing discrimination that occurs 
every year. 
This Note examines two potential solutions to supplement the current 
disparate impact litigation regime.  First, this Note explores giving formerly 
incarcerated people protected class status.  Protected class status would allow 
plaintiffs to pursue FHA claims under the disparate treatment theory.24  
Plaintiffs would be able to challenge housing policies that facially 
discriminate against those who have criminal records.25  However, several 
hurdles would have to be overcome to pursue this approach, and the recourse 
afforded—litigation—still falls short of a solution to the problem.  At the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Compare HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, with Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015). 
 22. Outcomes for plaintiffs may differ depending on whether an administrative hearing is 
conducted versus federal litigation. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.  However, 
one could speculate that HUD, in the current conservative administration, will align their 
disparate impact policies in accordance with the Court’s narrower interpretation. See infra 
notes 409-11 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Ben S. Carson, Experimenting with Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 
23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-
rules-try-to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/CPU9-8APP] (“These government-engineered 
attempts to legislate racial equality create consequences that often make matters worse. There 
are reasonable ways to use housing policy to enhance the opportunities available to lower-
income citizens, but based on the history of failed socialist experiments in this country, 
entrusting the government to get it right can prove downright dangerous.”). 
 24. Unlike disparate impact, disparate treatment addresses policies and practices that 
facially discriminate against a protected class of individuals. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 25. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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outset, whether formerly incarcerated people meet the legal criteria for 
protected class status is debatable.  Moreover, like disparate impact, 
disparate treatment is often hard to prove26 and is still rooted in the litigation 
regime, thus subject to the aforementioned problems.  This Note concludes 
that the feasibility of a protected class designation is questionable. 
As a second solution, this Note explores the adoption of the Pay for 
Success (“PFS”) model in conjunction with the use of Social Impact Bonds 
(“SIBs”) to operate outside the litigation framework by funding housing 
programs for formerly incarcerated people.  The PFS model is a private-
public partnership for the achievement of a social good.27  Under the PFS 
model, partnerships can be forged with non-profits or other service providers 
whose programs have been shown to achieve successful outcomes (“proven 
models” or “proven programs”) to expand the reach of their services to larger 
populations.28  Thus, proven models can be scaled up to effectively provide 
safe, stable, and affordable housing to more formerly incarcerated people.  
This Note concludes that this solution, if implemented responsibly, is a more 
viable remedy that supplements the current litigation model and avoids the 
problems surrounding the disparate impact test. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of mass incarceration and housing 
segregation in the United States that led to the current intersection of poverty, 
imprisonment, segregation, and homelessness.  It describes the types of 
discrimination formerly incarcerated people face, reviews recent state action 
regarding criminal history screening, and explains the current FHA disparate 
impact litigation regime.  Part II identifies the inadequacies of the current 
disparate impact litigation regime by analyzing the effect Texas v. Inclusive 
Communities will have, and discusses current disparate impact litigation 
cases at bar.  It also explores the benefits and detriments of two potential 
solutions:  (1) the creation of a protected class of formerly incarcerated 
persons and (2) the PFS model.  Part III concludes that the PFS model is a 
unique solution that state and local governments should implement to help 
formerly incarcerated people secure safe, stable, and affordable housing.  By 
expanding proven housing programs and allocating state funds based on the 
specific housing needs of formerly incarcerated persons, states can 
                                                                                                                 
 26. For example, housing providers, in an attempt to avoid disparate treatment liability, 
may adopt unwritten policies that treat those with criminal records differently, making explicit 
discrimination hard to prove. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 27. In the PFS model, the government (acting as a back-payor) contracts with one or more 
service providers (typically non-profits) to provide certain social services.  Private investors 
provide the upfront capital to fund these services.  The investor is only paid back (by the 
government) if outcomes are achieved. See infra Section II.C. 
 28. The process of expanding proven programs to reach a larger population is typically 
referred to as “scaling up.”  Programs that undergo this expansion can be referred to as 
“scaling programs.” See infra Section II.C. 
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effectively reduce recidivism, lessen expenditures, and achieve positive 
social outcomes for the formerly incarcerated population and society at large. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The United States imprisons more of its population than any other nation 
in the developed world.29  The number of people incarcerated in the United 
States has increased dramatically in the past forty years.  In 1980, roughly 
500,000 people were incarcerated—today, that number has quadrupled to 
over 2.3 million.30  However, the demographics of the prison population do 
not mirror the demographics of the American population.31  Black 
Americans make up 37.8 percent of the federal prison population, but only 
13.3 percent of the total U.S. population.32  White Americans make up 58.7 
percent of the federal prison population, yet comprise 77.1 percent of the 
total population.33  Some studies reveal that this misrepresentation does not 
reflect actual disparities in illegal activity, but is instead a result of the 
disproportionate criminalization of communities of color.34 
Scholars attribute much of the prison population increase to the “War on 
Drugs,” a policy which incarcerated many non-violent offenders,35 and the 
over-policing of Black communities.36  As scholars have noted, “[b]etween 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People up at a Higher Rate than Any Other 
Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/
wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/ 
[https://perma.cc/596U-GKEL]. 
 30. NAACP, supra note 5; Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration:  The 
Whole Pie 2016, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2016.html [https://perma.cc/J5MJ-TA64] (“The American criminal justice system 
holds more than 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 102 federal prisons, 942 juvenile 
correctional facilities, 3,283 local jails, and 79 Indian Country jails as well as in military 
prisons, immigration detention facilities, civil commitment centers, and prisons in the U.S. 
territories.”). 
 31. NAACP, supra note 5; Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 30. 
 32. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 6; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6. 
 33. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 6; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6. 
 34. See Kate Linden Morris, Note, “Within Constitutional Limitations:” Challenging 
Criminal Background Checks by Public Housing Authorities Under the Fair Housing Act, 47 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 171 (2015) (“For example, research has shown that, although 
people of color are no more likely to use or sell illegal drugs than Whites, they are arrested at 
higher rates, and an analysis of federal sentencing data by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
in 2010 revealed that once convicted, Black people are more likely to receive higher sentences 
than similarly situated White people for the same crimes.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 35. See generally Michael Tonry, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities, and the War on 
Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 475 (1994). But see JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN:  THE TRUE 
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (arguing that 
prosecutorial discretion is the true culprit of this forty year incarceration boom). 
 36. See, e.g., MARY PATTILLO ET AL., IMPRISONING AMERICA:  THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF 
MASS INCARCERATION 2 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds. 2004) (“Although young minority men with 
little schooling had relatively high rates of incarceration, before the 1980s the penal system 
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1982 and 1999, drug sentences in federal and state prisons increased by 975 
percent.”37  Today, non-violent offenders make up the majority of the 
national prison population:  46.4 percent of incarcerated individuals are in 
federal prison due to non-violent drug offenses,38 and roughly thirty-eight 
percent of those convicted are Black Americans.39 
Yet, even prior to the war on drugs, Black Americans have historically 
been overrepresented in prisons.40  The Thirteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, which formally abolished slavery after the Civil War, 
contains language that some scholars refer to as a “convict exception.”41  The 
Thirteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[n]either slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.”42  Scholars argue that the original 
understanding of this clause recognized that slavery was constitutionally 
permitted “when the class of people to be enslaved were prison inmates.”43 
                                                                                                                 
was not a dominant presence in disadvantaged neighborhoods.  Criminal behavior, as 
officially recognized by the police, was much more unusual than poverty.  The utter 
marginality of prisons and other carceral institutions shaped criminological and penological 
understanding of punishment.”). 
 37. Zach Newman, Note, “Hands up, Don’t Shoot”:  Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal 
Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 135 (2015) (citations 
omitted). 
 38. T.J. Raphael & Dana Roberson, President Trump, Do You Support Rehabilitation or 
Incarceration for Nonviolent Drug Offenders?, PRI (Mar. 1, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-01/president-trump-do-you-support-rehabilitation-or-
incarceration-nonviolent-drug [https://perma.cc/G5Q4-4L68]. 
 39. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 6; Sam Taxy et al., Drug Offenders in Federal 
Prison:  Estimates of Characteristics Based on Linked Data, DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATS. 3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C857-J8ZZ] (“About three-quarters of drug offenders in federal prison were either non-
Hispanic black or African American (39%) or Hispanic or Latino (37%); nearly a quarter 
(22%) were non-Hispanic white offenders.  In addition, drug offenders in federal prison were 
overwhelmingly male (92%), about a quarter (24%) were noncitizens, and nearly 80% were 
age 30 or older.”). 
 40. See Robert Johnson et al., The American Prison in Historical Perspective:  Race, 
Gender, and Adjustment, in PRISONS:  TODAY AND TOMORROW 22, 23 (2nd ed. 2005) (citing 
T. SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM, (1st ed. 1976)) (“Minorities, by contrast, have 
always formed a sizable portion of the prison population.  In fact, ethnic and, after the Civil 
War, racial minorities have almost certainly been overrepresented in American prisons.”). 
 41. Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The Ironic Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for 
Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1180 (2013). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 43. Henderson, supra note 41, at 1180 (“The ‘ironic promise’ is that the constitutional 
provision explicitly granting states authority to coerce forced labor from convicts as 
punishment within its first section is the same amendment granting Congress the authority to 
limit other forms of subordination levied upon this same group in its second section.”). 
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After the Civil War, there was an uptick in incarceration rates of Black 
Americans in southern states due to the enactment of “Black Codes.”44  
Integral to these Black Codes were vagrancy laws, which allowed local 
municipalities to arrest and imprison newly freed Black Americans for minor 
infractions.45  Once in prison, incarcerated persons were forced to provide 
free labor, a practice known as convict leasing.46  Some scholars refer to this 
practice as “slavery by another name.”47  Although Black Codes were 
abolished during the Reconstruction Era, Jim Crow laws quickly took hold 
in the late 1890s, mandating segregation in public places under the guise of 
separate but equal.48 
Once Black Americans began to move north, local governments in 
northern states promulgated a host of racially discriminatory land use laws 
in an attempt to keep Black people out of their white neighborhoods.49  
Subsequently, the newly established Federal Housing Administration50 
engaged in discriminatory lending practices known as redlining.51  Banks 
                                                                                                                 
 44. RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW 8-9 (1st ed. 2003) (explaining 
that these laws severely restricted the newfound freedoms of Black Americans such as the 
ability to own property, purchase and lease land, conduct business, and move freely in public 
places). 
 45. See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME:  THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (1st ed. 2008). 
 46. See id. at 64-66; see also Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-
america/406177/ [https://perma.cc/57YF-4SND] (“Over the decades, prison labor has 
expanded in scope and reach.  Incarcerated workers, laboring within in-house operations or 
through convict-leasing partnerships with for-profit businesses, have been involved with 
mining, agriculture, and all manner of manufacturing from making military weapons to 
sewing garments for Victoria’s Secret . . . . In a sense, slavery never ended at Angola; it was 
reinvented.”). 
 47. See, e.g., BLACKMON, supra note 45. 
 48. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Ed., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); David Pilgram, What Was Jim Crow, FERRIS ST. U. (2012), 
http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm [https://perma.cc/65JR-92AT]. 
 49. Racial zoning was used as a means of legal de jure segregation.  In 1917 the Supreme 
Court ruled that racial zoning was unconstitutional. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 
81-82 (1917).  However, this decision disallowed legal statutes, not private agreements. See 
id.  The enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was not disallowed until 1948. See 
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  Yet, “[i]t was not until 1968 that the actual inclusion 
of racially-restrictive covenants into deeds was deemed illegal, although many such covenants 
can still be found within the language of deeds today.” Historical Shift from Explicit to 
Implicit Policies Affecting Housing Segregation in Eastern Massachusetts, 1948-1968:  
Unenforceable Restrictive Covenants, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF GREATER BOS., http://www.boston
fairhousing.org/timeline/1948-1968-Unenforceable-Restrictive-Covenants.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2FN-BH2R]. 
 50. The Federal Housing Administration was created in 1934 by the National Housing 
Act of 1934. See 12 U.S.C. § 1701. 
 51. See Fair Lending Regulations and Statutes, Consumer Compliance Handbook, FED. 
RES., https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_fhact.pdf 
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and financial institutions “refused loans to black families in white suburbs 
and even, in most cases, to black families in black neighborhoods—leading 
to the deterioration and ghettoization of those neighborhoods.”52  Many 
whites living in cities and public housing bought and moved to homes in the 
suburbs using low-interest mortgages.53  This concentrated Black Americans 
in inner cities, and helped to produce a downward income shift in the 
population residing in public housing after the 1940s.54  Eventually redlining 
and a host of other discriminatory laws were challenged and repealed by 
federal legislation in the 1960s.55 
In an effort to subdue the unrest and unaffordability of urban housing for 
people of color, in the 1960s Congress funded large public housing 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/3QY4-YBA9] (“Redlining is the practice of denying a creditworthy 
applicant a loan for housing in a certain neighborhood even though the applicant may 
otherwise be eligible for the loan.  The term refers to the presumed practice of mortgage 
lenders of drawing red lines around portions of a map to indicate areas or neighborhoods in 
which they do not want to make loans.”); Lorren Patterson, The Impact of Disparate Impact:  
The Benefits Outweigh the Costs of Recognizing Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 8 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 211, 216 (2016). 
 52. Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, and Segregated 
Neighborhoods–A Constitutional Insult, RACE & SOC. PROB.S (2014), http://www.epi.org/
publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoods-
a-constitutional-insult/ [https://perma.cc/XX92-MQDW]. 
 53. See Historical Shift from Explicit to Implicit Policies Affecting Housing Segregation 
in Eastern Massachusetts, 1950s-1975:  Impact of Rte 128 & Rte 495, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF 
GREATER BOS., http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/1950s-1975-Suburbs.html 
[https://perma.cc/HA2M-QEKZ] (explaining that from the 1950s through 1975, large 
highways were built that enabled white flight to suburban towns).  From the 1970s through 
today, local municipalities utilized large-lot zoning, single-family housing, minimum multi-
family zoning, and restrictions on age to concentrate wealth and effectively exclude people of 
color from moving to suburban areas. See Historical Shift from Explicit to Implicit Policies 
Affecting Housing Segregation in Eastern Massachusetts, 1970s-Present:  Disparate Impact 
of Local Land Use Regulations, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF GREATER BOS., http://www.boston
fairhousing.org/timeline/1970s-present-Local-Land_use-Regulations.html 
[https://perma.cc/8DE4-27TE]. 
 54. J.A. Stoloff, A Brief History of Public Housing, OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES., DEP’T 
HOUS. & URB. DEV. 6, http://reengageinc.org/research/brief_history_public_housing.pdf 
(“Over time, advocates for the poor asked that preferences on waiting lists be given to the 
most disadvantaged applicants, in particular to the homeless and displaced.  This, combined 
with income limits, ensured that public housing residents were drawn from the least well-off 
segments of society.  Anyone who could afford to live elsewhere moved out of public housing, 
and whites had more opportunities than minorities to take advantage of government subsidies 
that promoted homeownership.”). 
 55. See generally The Fair Housing Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (making the 
practice of redlining unlawful); The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 88 P.L. 352, 78 Stat. 241, 88 
P.L. 352, 78 Stat. 241 (ending de jure segregation of public spaces). See also Stoloff, supra 
note 54, at 6 (explaining the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also ended segregation in public 
housing). 
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projects.56  However, these projects served to reinforce already existing 
racial segregation patterns.57  Residents of public housing, who were 
overwhelmingly Black,58 were demonized and stereotyped, social inequities 
were ignored, and violence, inner-city decay, and crime became linked with 
public housing.59  In response, Congress enacted a series of more stringent 
reforms that enabled PHAs to more easily screen out and evict tenants with 
criminal records.60  The culmination of these policies resulted in HUD’s 
1996 “One Strike” guidelines, which encouraged PHAs to adopt screening 
criteria by tying funding to the implementation of these policies.61  More 
often than not, these policies were in the form of blanket bans on those with 
criminal records without consideration of individualized circumstances.62  
Thus, those already facing legal discrimination in the private housing market 
due to their criminal records also faced stringent PHA screening policies, 
which effectively “locked out a population with nowhere else to live.”63 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Jeff R. Crump, The End of Public Housing as We Know It:  Public Housing Policy, 
Labor Regulation and the US City, 27 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RES. 177, 179-80 (2003). 
 57. See id. at 181 (“Ghetto boundaries were made visible by highways or other spatial 
barriers and the design of public housing set it apart from the urban fabric, making it easy to 
identify public housing residents and keep them within well-defined borders of ‘the 
projects.’”); see also Rothstein, supra note 52 (“[I]t remains an open question whether it really 
was in [Black American’s] best interests to be herded into segregated projects, where their 
poverty was concentrated and isolated from the American mainstream.”). 
 58. See Stoloff, supra note 54, at 6 (“Ironically, while ending legal discrimination by no 
longer allowing racially segregated projects, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contributed to the 
movement of whites out of projects when they became racially integrated.”). 
 59. See Jesse Kropf, Note, Keeping “Them” Out:  Criminal Record Screening, Public 
Housing, and the Fight Against Racial Case, 4 GEO J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 75, 
85 (2012) (“[O]pponents demonized public housing residents . . . . Ignoring the staggering 
social inequalities facing urban minority communities, public housing thus became linked 
with inner-city decay and violence.”); id. at 85 n.66 (“This corresponded to a general 
stigmatization of inner-city Blacks as welfare queens and gangbangers, which accompanied 
the War on Drugs.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 60. See Kropf, supra note 59, at 85 n.68 (“The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act granted PHAs 
the power to evict any tenant engaged in any criminal activity on or near the premises.  In 
1996, Congress passed the Housing Opportunity and Extension Act urging PHAs to exclude 
people based on their criminal records and allowing PHAs to deny applicants it believed to 
be abusing alcohol or drugs, regardless of any conviction.”) (citations omitted). 
 61. See HUD, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT, supra note 9; see also Kropf, supra note 59, 
at 86; Morris, supra note 34, at 164-66 (providing a summary of the Quality Housing and 
Work Responsibility Act (“QHWRA”), the final statutory amendments to the “One Strike” 
policy). 
 62. See Kropf, supra note 59, at 78. 
 63. Id. at 87. 
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A. Incarceration, Segregation, and Poverty Today 
“Two hundred fifty years of slavery.  Ninety years of Jim Crow.  Sixty years 
of separate but equal.  Thirty-five years of racist housing policy.  Until we 
reckon with our compounding moral debts, America will never be whole.”64 
Today, the criminal justice system is defined by over-criminalization, 
over-punishment, and discriminatory policing and prosecuting.65  As a result, 
federal prisons and state jails are filled beyond capacity, with people of color 
overrepresented.66  Upon conviction, incarcerated persons are burdened with 
“collateral consequences”—indirect penalties imposed by state and federal 
statutes that disadvantage and deny them political, social, and economic 
rights and privileges that most Americans consider to be fundamental and 
intrinsic components of citizenship.67  Consequently, these individuals are 
“shackled with the stigma of their prison record long after serving time 
behind bars,”68 which makes housing and employment difficult to obtain.69 
Also today, neighborhoods, towns, and cities remain deeply segregated.70  
Many neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty are comprised 
predominately of people of color.71  Some of these individuals are stuck in a 
cycle of poverty and recidivism:  “[w]hen individuals are economically 
impoverished, they are more likely to not only offend, but also repeatedly 
offend, because poverty compounded with the imposed civil disabilities of a 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Coates, supra note 9. 
 65. See Newman, supra note 37, at 134. 
 66. See supra Part I. 
 67. See Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice:  Prisoner Reentry as an 
Opportunity to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259, 267 
(2009) (explaining that these penalties can affect parental rights; voting rights; jury service; 
employment; licensing; driver’s licenses and passports; educational grants, loans and work 
assistance; federal welfare benefits; and public housing); see also, Etienne C. Toussaint, 
Incarceration to Incorporation:  Economic Empowerment for Returning Citizens Through 
Social Impact Bonds, 25 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 61, 64 (2016) (“Not only does 
America’s criminal justice system overwhelmingly target young Black men in low-income 
communities as the primary perpetrators of criminal activity, but it also routinely relegates 
them to second-class citizenship upon their release from prison.”). 
 68. Toussaint, supra note 67, at 64. 
 69. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-
age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/F2RN-JE5W] (“Our carceral state 
banishes American citizens to a gray wasteland far beyond the promises and protections the 
government grants its other citizens.  Banishment continues long after one’s actual time 
behind bars has ended, making housing and employment hard to secure.”). 
 70. See Matthew Bloch et al., Mapping Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/08/us/census-race-map.html 
[https://perma.cc/3D3S-VUFC]. 
 71. See, e.g., Poverty Data Tool, N.Y.C. CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/html/poverty/lookup.shtml [https://perma.cc/LKH8-JDZM]. 
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criminal conviction further socially isolate and minimize their life 
options.”72 
B. The Importance of Reducing Recidivism 
Reducing recidivism is an important goal of many municipalities for both 
social and economic reasons.73  An average of roughly 650,000 people are 
released from federal and state prisons annually, and 11.4 million cycle in 
and out of local jails annually.74  An estimated forty to fifty percent of people 
released from prison are re-incarcerated within three years of their release.75  
Recidivism, coupled with a growing incarceration rate has resulted in huge 
correctional expenses born by the states:  in recent years, annual correctional 
expenses have surpassed fifty billion dollars.76 
From a social perspective, reducing recidivism can create safer 
communities and promote long-term public safety goals.77  Reducing 
recidivism helps both the communities in which formerly incarcerated 
people typically live in, and their family members who they often 
disproportionately rely on for support.78  Programs to reduce recidivism can 
act as a means to confront and counteract racism and bring about social 
justice.79  From an economic perspective, reducing the number of 
incarcerated people reduces the cost states and municipalities spend on 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Alina Ball, Comment, An Imperative Redefinition of “Community”:  
Incorporating Reentry Lawyers to Increase The Efficacy of Community Economic 
Development Initiatives, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1883, 1883 (2008); see also Lyles-Chockley, 
supra note 67, at 263 n.29 (“[T]he exit and reentry of prison inmates is geographically 
concentrated in America’s poorest minority neighborhoods.”) (citing Todd R. Clear, The 
Problem with “Addition by Subtraction”:  The Prison-Crime Relationship in Low-Income 
Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:  THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT 181, 184 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)). 
 73. See Report:  17 States Reduce Recidivism, Save Billions by Reinvesting Wisely, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/jan/13/
report-17-states-reduce-recidivism-save-billions-reinvesting-wisely/ [https://perma.cc/5F4T-
YT9K]. 
 74. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 1; Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 30. 
 75. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 1. 
 76. See id. (“[A] handful of states spend more discretionary dollars on corrections than 
higher education.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 77. See Recidivism Reduction Checklist–Executive and Legislative Policymakers, CSG 
JUST. CTR, https://csgjusticecenter.org/reentry/legislative-and-executive-policymakers/ 
[https://perma.cc/57PA-3P7T]. 
 78. Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 1; see also Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for 
Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1196-97 (2006) (“Since ex-
offenders are often important breadwinners, their innocent families and relatives also 
suffer . . . . [o]n top of the significant expense of supporting an inmate, then, inmates’ families 
face a loss of income.  Similarly, since poor communities of color receive a disproportionately 
high number of ex-offenders, these communities have even fewer resources for rehabilitation 
per ex-offender.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 79. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 67, at 259. 
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corrections.80  Many municipalities, aware of this cost savings, track 
recidivism rates by setting targets and implementing proven programs81 to 
curb recidivism.82 
Despite efforts currently undertaken by many states, the recidivism 
problem still persists.83  Many state policies designed to reduce recidivism 
focus on helping formerly incarcerated people obtain jobs.84  However, 
overcoming barriers to housing is arguably one of, if not the most important 
step in reducing recidivism and ending the cycle of poverty and 
homelessness.85  Housing stability is the “lynchpin that holds the 
reintegration process together.”86 
C. The Intersection of Homelessness and Incarceration 
Residential instability and homelessness are two of the greatest challenges 
formerly incarcerated people face that limit their chances of successful 
reentry.87  Roughly one out of ten people who become incarcerated have 
experienced homelessness in their lifetime prior to prison, and one out of ten 
who leave prison will experience homelessness in the future.88  
Approximately twenty percent of single homeless adults have served time, 
and this number is even higher in urban areas.89  For example, in New York 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See PRISON LEGAL NEWS, supra note 73. 
 81. For example, the N.Y.C. FUSE Initiative is one such program. See Adala et al., infra 
note 97 and accompanying text. 
 82. See, e.g., March Schabses, Criminal Justice Technical Report, N.Y. DIV. OF CRIM. 
JUST. SERVS. 3 (Oct. 2013), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/resultsfirst/rf-
technical_report_cba1_oct2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZT2-F47X]. 
 83. See Toussaint, supra note 67, at 65. 
 84. See Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1458 (2014) (“Employment became a central focus of a loose 
‘re-entry movement’ that joined activists and policymakers interested in helping prisoners re-
integrate into their communities.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 85. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 1, 5. 
 86. JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK:  FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER 
REENTRY 219 (2005) (quoting Katharine H. Bradley et al., No Place Like Home:  Housing 
and the Ex- Prisoner, CMTY. RES. FOR JUST. (2001), http://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/a5b5d8
fa98ed957505_hqm6b5qp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRB8-LZ2H]). 
 87. Faith E. Lutze et al., Homelessness and Reentry:  A Multistate Outcome Evaluation 
of Washington State’s Reentry Housing Program for High Risk Offenders, 41 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 471, 472 (2014). 
 88. See Marie Claire Tran-Leung, When Discretion Means Denial:  A National 
Perspective on Criminal Records Barriers to Federally Subsidized Housing, SHRIVER CTR. 2 
(2015), http://www.povertylaw.org/files/docs/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U26-
4W8F] (citing Stephen Metraux et al., Incarceration And Homelessness 9-5 (2007), 
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/p9.pdf [https://perma.cc/N58L-SX5F]; Caterina 
Gouvis Roman & Jeremy Travis, Taking Stock:  Housing, Homelessness and Prisoner 
Reentry, URB. INST. 7-8 (2004), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/411096-Taking-Stock.PDF [https://perma.cc/EF9G-QDVT]). 
 89. See Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 2. 
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City about one-third of single adults in shelters have been recently released 
from local jails.90  Access to safe and stable housing is critical to successful 
reentry, making one less likely to recidivate.91  One study demonstrated that 
the chances of recidivism were doubled for those who lacked adequate 
housing.92  Further, a comprehensive analysis of a Washington state 
program,93 which aims to reduce recidivism by providing high-risk formerly 
incarcerated persons94 with one year of housing support, proved to be 
successful:  the rates of new offenses and recidivism were significantly 
reduced.95  This study further recommended that subsidized housing for high 
risk formerly incarcerated persons be a “central part of coordinated responses 
to reentry.”96  Similarly, New York City’s “FUSE” Initiative97 has also 
achieved success in reducing recidivism of high-risk formerly incarcerated 
people by collaborating with ten non-profits and various City agencies to 
provide supportive housing.98 
Access to stable housing provides formerly incarcerated people with a 
platform upon which they can begin to focus on reintegrating, whether that 
be finding a job, obtaining treatment for mental health or drug addiction, 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See id. (citing N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Special Comm. on Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Proceedings, Re-Entry and Reintegration:  The Road to Public Safety 219 (May 
2006), http://www.nysba.org/Workarea/Downloadasset.aspx?Id=26857 [https://perma.cc/
54JR-47SH]) (explaining this figure is substantially higher if prisons are also included). 
 91. See Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 2 (citing Julian M. Somers et al., Housing First 
Reduces Re-Offending Among Formerly Homeless Adults with Mental Disorders:  Results of 
a Randomized Controlled Trial, PLOS ONE 1, 6-7 (Sept. 2013), http://journals.
plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0072946 [https://perma.cc/8QCX-5ZJQ]); 
see also Michael G. Allen, et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule:  A Practitioner’s 
Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 192 (2014) (“[A]n individual’s inability to find 
stable, affordable housing upon release from prison contributes dramatically to recidivism.”). 
 92. Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 2 (citing Lornet Turnbull, Few Rentals for Freed 
Felons, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010, 10:09 PM), http://o.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/localnews/2013552561_housing30m.html [https://perma.cc/R5ZA-J7PC]). 
 93. The program is called the “Reentry Housing Pilot Program (RHPP).” Lutze et al., 
supra note 87, at 471. 
 94. High-risk generally refers to individuals who have cycled in and out of jail or prison 
and in and out of homelessness multiple times in their lives. 
 95. See Lutze et al., supra note 87, at 471. 
 96. Id. 
 97. “Frequent Users Service Enhancement.” Angela A. Adala et al., New York City FUSE 
II Evaluation Report, COLUM. U. MAILMAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH i, http://www.csh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/FUSE-Eval-Report-Final_Linked.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6C6-
XB5Y]. 
 98. See id. (This is a “collaboration between the Corporation for Supportive Housing; The 
New York City Departments of Homeless Services, Correction, Health and Mental Hygiene, 
and Housing Preservation and Development; The New York City Housing Authority; and ten 
non-profit providers of housing and services.  FUSE provided supportive housing to roughly 
200 individuals who were frequently cycling in and out of jails and homeless shelters . . . . 
supportive housing significantly improved their lives by reducing their cycling between public 
systems, their days spent in jail and shelter and their use of crisis health services.”). 
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rebuilding a social network, or reconnecting with their community and 
family.99  Housing for formerly incarcerated people can serve a larger 
purpose beyond mere shelter:  “it can also serve as the literal and figurative 
foundation for successful reentry and reintegration for released adults.”100 
D. Forms of Housing Discrimination Formerly Incarcerated People 
Face 
“Providing an effective second chance for folks with criminal justice 
involvement starts with housing . . . . You can’t rejoin a community without 
access to housing.  And you can’t reconnect a family without a home in which 
to do so.”101 
Formerly incarcerated people ideally have five housing options when 
released from prison:  private housing; federally subsidized housing; 
supportive housing; community correctional facilities or halfway houses; 
and homeless shelters.102  Yet, formerly incarcerated people face barriers to 
accessing housing options “regardless of their level of self-sufficiency and 
employment prospects.”103 
In the private housing market, formerly incarcerated people face an 
economic barrier:  the inability to afford to buy or rent in the private housing 
market.104  Formerly incarcerated people also face a discrimination barrier:  
landlords routinely conduct background checks and reject those with 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Lutze et al., supra note 87, at 472-73. 
 100. Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 3 (“Quite simply, individuals released from prisons 
and jails need to secure a place to sleep on their very first night out of the correctional 
institution.  For many, they return to their communities having only temporary housing 
arrangements; therefore, their initial housing placement in the community is nothing more 
than a “landing spot” or temporary destination.”) (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 5 
(“The provision of short- and long-term housing for individuals targeted to their level of need 
could be the key to successful reentry.”). 
 101. Statement by Tonya Robinson, Acting General Counsel, HUD. See Sargent Shriver 
National Center on Poverty Law, Ensuring Fair Housing for People with Criminal Records:  
A Conversation with HUD, Webinar & Presentation (Oct. 26, 2016), [hereinafter A 
Conversation with HUD] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4tTiGgOky8 [https://perma.
cc/XUP6-FA4N]. 
 102. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8 at 5-6. 
 103. Id. at 5. 
 104. See NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJECT, The Importance of Stable Housing for Formerly 
Incarcerated Individuals, 40 HOUS. L. BULL. 60, 60 (2010), https://www.nhlp.org/files/
NHLP%20Bull%20Feb10_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D874-5BAG] [hereinafter NHLP 
BULLETIN]. 
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criminal histories,105 further limiting their ability to obtain housing in the 
private market.106 
Formerly incarcerated people have difficulty obtaining federally 
subsidized housing units due to long wait lists, lotteries, and overly 
restrictive criminal history policies.107  The Sargent Shriver National Center 
on Poverty Law has identified four rationales for why these criminal history 
policies are overly restrictive:  (1) “unreasonable lookback periods;”108 (2) 
“use of arrests to prove criminal activity;”109 (3) “overbroad categories of 
criminal activity;”110 and (4) “underuse of mitigating circumstances.”111  
HUD, and even some states, have begun to regulate these policies in an 
attempt to mitigate their discriminatory effects.112 
Formerly incarcerated people also face challenges in finding supportive 
housing.  While supportive housing options exist,113 these programs have 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Landlords have historically defined “criminal history” to include arrests where there 
was no conviction.  In the past several years HUD has made clear this is not permissible, yet 
the practice still continues in many instances. See generally Tran-Leung, supra note 88 
(explaining that landlords will reject people with criminal histories, regardless of the severity 
of the crime, mitigating circumstances, how long ago it occurred, or the positive behavior and 
rehabilitation exhibited years after the crime). 
 106. Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at V (“Although HUD has suggested that five years is a 
reasonable lookback period for serious crimes, some PHAs are looking back seven, ten, and 
even twenty years for a wide variety of crimes . . . . even where admissions policies set forth 
seemingly reasonable lookback periods, they are often inconsistent in terms of which of the 
following events triggers the denial:  (i) when the applicant engaged in the criminal activity; 
(ii) when the applicant was arrested; (iii) when the applicant was convicted; or (iv) when the 
applicant was released from incarceration or other correctional supervision.”). 
 109. Id. at VI (“[I]nstead of determining whether criminal activity took place, many 
housing providers treat a criminal arrest the same as criminal activity, even if the applicant 
was never convicted of the underlying offense.”). 
 110. Id. at VIII-IX (Federal law allows PHAs to design policies that relate to “drug-related 
criminal activity, violent criminal activity, and criminal activity that pose a threat to the health, 
safety, and welfare of other residents.”  However, PHAs commonly ban applicants with any 
past felony charges, including those charged with littering, shoplifting, or failure to pay a 
fine.). 
 111. Id. at X (Federal law requires PHAs to give consideration to mitigating circumstances, 
but some policies lack any reference to this requirement, and as a result “formerly incarcerated 
individuals knew about their local PHAs’ screening criteria, but they did not know that they 
could appeal the denial of their application.”). 
 112. See infra Section I.F. 
 113. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 7-8 (“[S]upportive housing is an effective 
platform for individuals with histories of chronic residential instability, mental illness, and 
institutional cycling . . . . studies on supportive housing seem to suggest that supportive 
housing can reduce service use among formerly incarcerated persons with extensive histories 
of homelessness and incarceration.”). 
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limited spots available,114 and when new developments are proposed many 
communities react with “not in my backyard” (“NIMBY”) attitudes.115  Such 
attitudes, and the resulting campaigns against proposed developments 
contribute to the lack of available services and housing stock for formerly 
incarcerated persons upon their release.116 
Furthermore, there are not enough governmental services such as 
community correctional facilities or halfway houses available to recently 
released individuals, and most states do not implement housing plans for 
recently un-incarcerated persons.117  The communities of recently released 
individuals are also ill-equipped; most communities generally have a 
shortage of affordable housing stock.118  As a result, formerly incarcerated 
people may end up in unstable arrangements, or their families must bear the 
cost of housing them.119 
Lastly, shelters are not a viable option for all formerly incarcerated people.  
For example, some individuals chose to remain on the streets rather than stay 
in a shelter due to stories they have heard or experiences they have had in 
dangerous and unsanitary shelters:  “you hear a lot of terrible things about 
shelters, that shelters are dangerous places, that they’re full of drugs and drug 
dealers, that people will steal your shoes, and there’s bedbugs and body lice.  
And yeah, unfortunately a lot of those things are true.”120  Additionally, 
                                                                                                                 
 114. For example, the Fortune Society in New York City has helped hundreds of formerly 
incarcerated people, and operates two facilities; however, they have limited space, offering 
sixty-two beds for emergency and transitional housing. See Terrance Ross, Fortune Society 
Halfway House Marks 10 Yrs. Helping Ex-Inmates, Homeless in Harlem, N.Y. Daily News 
(June 21, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/fortune-
society-halfway-house-marks-10-yrs-helping-ex-inmates-homeless-harlem-article-
1.1099476 [https://perma.cc/9N54-9KB7]. 
 115. See Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 8. 
 116. See id. at 6. 
 117. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 7. 
 118. See id. at 8 (“[R]esearch has shown that released prisoners disproportionately return 
to a few, often clustered, neighborhoods with high social and economic disadvantage and low 
institutional investment.  This is problematic because released prisoners who return to these 
disadvantaged neighborhoods have a higher risk of reoffending than those who do not return 
to such neighborhoods.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 119. See id. at 9 (“[R]esiding on one’s own instead of relying on family and friends for 
housing is related to lower recidivism rates among released prisoners in Illinois.”). But c.f. id. 
at 8 (“The location of the housing unit—particularly if it is in a neighborhood that differs from 
where the released prisoner was living before prison—may also afford adults the opportunity 
to separate themselves from the former social networks and opportunities that originally 
contributed to their criminal activity . . . those who return to a different neighborhood than the 
one where they were arrested are less likely to recidivate than those who return to their old 
neighborhood.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 120. Interview with David Pirtle, James Greene, & Kathy Sibert (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/12/06/166666265/why-some-homeless-choose-the-streets-over-
shelters [https://perma.cc/L3K8-BTRX]. 
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similar to supportive housing, many residents oppose the construction of 
shelters in their neighborhoods, thwarting the creation of newer, less 
crowded, and likely safer facilities.121 
E. HUD Guidance and the Fair Housing Act:  The Litigation Regime 
Due to the difficulties facing the formerly incarcerated—systemic racism, 
residential segregation, homelessness, and harsh federal policies—HUD has 
taken a more active role in addressing their needs.  In the last several years, 
HUD has attempted to foster more fairness in the use of criminal records in 
housing decisions.  In 2011, the then Secretary of HUD, Shaun Donovan, in 
a series of letters to PHA executive directors, indicated that second chances 
are important:  formerly incarcerated people need support in “gain[ing] 
access to one of the most fundamental building blocks of a stable life—a 
place to live.”122  Donovan highlighted that HUD only imposes mandatory 
housing bans for two categories of former offenders:  (1) those convicted of 
manufacturing methamphetamine; and (2) registered sex offenders for 
life.123  All other mandatory bans are temporary,124 and denying housing is 
not mandatory in most cases.125 
In 2013, HUD codified a three-part test to prove disparate impact and 
establish liability under the FHA.126  The FHA bars discrimination against 
“any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See, e.g., Emma Whitford, Outraged Queens Residents Shout Down Homeless Shelter 
Proposal at Packed Meeting, GOTHAMIST (Sept. 1, 2016, 9:42 AM), http://gothamist.com/
2016/09/01/maspeth_homeless_shelter.php [https://perma.cc/LHC4-5YW9]. 
 122. Letter from Shaun Donovan, Secretary, HUD, to Public Housing Authority Executive 
Directors (June 17, 2011), [hereinafter Donovan Letter 1] http://nhlp.org/files/Rentry%
20letter%20from%20Donovan%20to%20PHAs%206-17-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7JB-
ZAYS]; Letter from Shaun Donovan, Secretary, HUD (Mar. 14, 2012), http://nhlp.org/files/
HUD%20Letter%203.14.12.pdf [hereinafter Donovan Letter 2] [https://perma.cc/YLV4-
5RTB]. 
 123. See Donovan Letter 1, supra note 122; 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(f)(1) (2012), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13663(a) (2015); 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204, 982.553 (2012). 
 124. See 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2012); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.553, 960.204(a)(2)(i)-(ii) 
(2012); Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook, HUD 73 (June 2003), [hereinafter Pub. Hous. 
Guidebook] https://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L6WP-7MHP]; see also Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 7 (The temporary 
drug-related eviction ban requires “PHAs and project owners [to] determine whether an 
applicant has ever been evicted from federally assisted housing for drug-related criminal 
activity.  If such an eviction took place in the past three years, the applicant must be 
denied . . . . If, however, the eviction took place more than three years prior to the application, 
the PHA or project owner has the discretion to admit the applicant.”). 
 125. See 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2012); 24 CFR 982.553 (2012); 
Pub. Hous. Guidebook, supra note 124; see also Geiger, supra note 78, at 1204 (explaining 
that PHAs and project owners may reject applicants who have engaged in drug-related 
criminal activity or violent criminal activity, or “other criminal activity that would adversely 
affect the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”). 
 126. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. 
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dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”127  
Under this regulation, “a practice has a discriminatory effect where it 
actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or 
creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns 
because of [protected class status].”128  In 2015, HUD issued guidance to 
PHAs and owners of federally assisted housing clarifying that arrest records 
alone could not be used as the basis for terminating assistance, evicting 
tenants, or denying admission to federally subsidized housing.129 
That same year, the Supreme Court in Texas v. Inclusive Communities 
recognized the disparate impact theory and prescribed certain 
“safeguards”130 based on its interpretation of the FHA.131  In April 2016, 
soon after the Court’s decision, HUD further clarified FHA standards on the 
use of criminal histories.132  This HUD guidance explained that due to the 
disproportionate number of people of color who have been involved in the 
criminal justice system, a housing provider with a policy that denies formerly 
incarcerated persons housing may be violating the FHA.133  Specifically the 
guidance noted, “[w]hile having a criminal record is not a protected 
characteristic under the Fair Housing Act, criminal history-based restrictions 
on housing opportunities violate the Act if, without justification, their burden 
falls more often on renters or other housing market participants of one race 
or national origin over another.”134  The 2016 guidance details and clarifies 
the three-step process first established in 2013 for reviewing a claim of 
discriminatory effect, which must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.135 
                                                                                                                 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 128. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a). 
 129. See HUD GUIDANCE 2015, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 130. See infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text. 
 131. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2525 (2015) (“The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the 
Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language, the Court’s interpretation of 
similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims 
in 1988 against the backdrop of the unanimous view of nine Courts of Appeals, and the 
statutory purpose.”). 
 132. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2. 
 133. See id. at 2.  Importantly, this policy does not create new standards or requirements, 
but rather, clarifies how existing standards apply. See id. 
 134. Id. at 2; see id. at 8 (explaining that intentional discrimination, when a housing 
provider treats applicants with substantially similar criminal histories unequally based on a 
protected characteristic, is also prohibited). 
 135. See id. (explaining that there is one exception (§ 807(b)(4)) under the statute to 
liability for a disparate impact claim:  housing providers can deny housing to those who have 
been convicted of manufacturing or distributing drugs). 
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The first step requires the plaintiff (or the “charging party” in a HUD 
administrative action)136 prove that the criminal history policy has a 
disparate impact on a particular group due to their race or national origin.137  
The plaintiff can satisfy the burden of proof in step one by presenting 
evidence that shows the practice actually or predictably results in a disparate 
impact.138  The plaintiff may use evidence such as housing applicant data, 
tenant files, census demographic data and localized criminal justice data.139  
If the plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof, the second step then shifts the 
burden to the housing provider to prove that the criminal history policy is 
necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest—
that the policy is justified.140  The interest of the housing provider must be 
proven with evidence that is not hypothetical or speculative.141  While 
protecting property and the safety of other residents is considered substantial 
and legitimate, “[b]ald assertions based on generalizations or stereotypes that 
any individual with an arrest or conviction record poses a greater risk than 
any other individual without such a record are not sufficient to satisfy this 
burden.”142  If the housing provider meets this burden, the third step requires 
the plaintiff to prove that the interest of the policy could be achieved by a 
less discriminatory alternative.143  A less discriminatory alternative often is 
one that involves an individualized assessment of the applicant beyond what 
is in the criminal record.144 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (explaining that plaintiffs may bring private actions against 
landlords in a federal proceeding (see 42 U.S.C. § 3613, 42 U.S.C. § 3614), or the charging 
party may bring an administrative action to be tried before HUD administrative law judges 
(see 42 U.S.C. § 3612)). 
 137. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. at 3-4. 
 140. See id. at 4. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 5-6.  A policy or practice of excluding individuals due to one or more prior 
arrests (without any conviction) or a policy that imposes a blanket prohibition on any person 
with any conviction record will fail this burden.  Moreover, a policy that fails to take into 
account when the conviction occurred, the underlying conduct, the actions of the convicted 
person since, the nature and severity of the conviction, and the amount of time that has passed 
is also unlikely to satisfy this burden. 
 143. See id. at 7. 
 144. See id. at 7 (“Relevant individualized evidence might include:  the facts or 
circumstances surrounding the criminal conduct; the age of the individual at the time of the 
conduct; evidence that the individual has maintained a good tenant history before and/or after 
the conviction or conduct; and evidence of rehabilitation efforts.  By delaying consideration 
of criminal history until after an individual’s financial and other qualifications are verified, a 
housing provider may be able to minimize any additional costs that such individualized 
assessment might add to the applicant screening process.”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2549 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (These HUD regulations and “the Court’s pronouncements are so hazy, courts—
550 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
Importantly, in Texas v. Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court 
limited the scope of a disparate impact claim “to protect potential defendants 
against abusive disparate-impact claims.”145  First, while the Court held that 
plaintiffs can use statistics to illustrate the discriminatory effect, it 
established a robust causality requirement:  liability is not found solely on 
the bases of “statistical disparity.”146  There must be a causal connection 
between the challenged policy and the alleged disparities to prevent race-
based considerations from being introduced into every housing decision.147  
Second, the justification for the policy provided by the defendant is “not 
contrary to the disparate-impact requirement, unless . . . artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary.”148  Third, any “remedial orders” issued by a court must 
“concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice” through “race-
neutral means.”149 
Overall, the Texas v. Inclusive Communities ruling is in tension with the 
HUD 2016 guidance and 2013 regulation.  There are several key differences 
between the Supreme Court’s use of disparate impact and HUD’s.  First, the 
limitations described above are absent from HUD’s 2013 regulation and 
2016 guidance:  the “robust causality requirement” established by the 
Supreme Court arguably creates a higher burden of proof for a plaintiff to 
meet in a private action, whereas HUD’s guidance provides greater 
discretion in investigating complaints.150 
Second, the Supreme Court’s language in describing the housing 
provider’s justification differs from that in HUD’s 2013 regulation.  HUD 
calls for the housing provider to furnish a “legally sufficient justification” 
that is “necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests,” which “could not be served by another practice 
                                                                                                                 
lacking expertise in the field of housing policy—may inadvertently harm the very people that 
the FHA is meant to help . . . . Congress did not intend to engage the federal courts in an 
endless exercise of second-guessing local programs.”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 145. Tex. v. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524. 
 146. Id. at 2512. 
 147. See id. at 2524. 
 148. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 149. Tex. v. Inclusive Cmyts., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“If additional measures are adopted, 
courts should strive to design them to eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral 
means.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Fair Housing Act—Disparate Impact and 
Racial Equality—Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 321, 328 (2015) (“Justice Kennedy’s concern 
for facial neutrality evinces a commitment to understanding and deconstructing race as a 
social concept perpetuated by the law.”). 
 150. Compare Tex. v. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507, with HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra 
note 2, at 3 (“National statistics provide grounds for HUD to investigate complaints 
challenging criminal history policies.”). 
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that has a less discriminatory effect.”151  The Court uses the term “valid 
interest” which may call for a lower standard of proof and could be more 
favorable to defendants.152  The Court did not elaborate on this point, and 
whether the Court intended to lower the standard of proof is an open question 
for future litigation.153 
These differences between the HUD 2013 regulation and 2016 guidance, 
and the Texas v. Inclusive Communities decision may lead to potentially 
conflicting outcomes in the future depending on the nature of the action.  For 
example, in an administrative action, HUD will likely enjoy more discretion 
in determining whether a policy results in disparate impact liability154—
assuming its 2016 guidance remains unchallenged.155  In contrast, when a 
case is brought in the courts, the plaintiff will likely have more difficulty 
satisfying her burden due to the additional “safeguards” detailed in Texas v. 
Inclusive Communities.156 
In response to the HUD guidance and Texas v. Inclusive Communities 
decision, several states have become significantly active in addressing 
criminal history screening policies.157 
                                                                                                                 
 151. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b). 
 152. See William E. Taibl, Fair Housing Act and Disparate-Impact – Is There a Bit of a 
Silver Lining in the Dark Cloud of a Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision?, NAT’L L. R. 
(2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/print/article/fair-housing-act-and-disparate-impact-
there-bit-silver-lining-dark-cloud-recent-us-s [https://perma.cc/K7MY-2AFZ]; see also 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in 
Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1141 (2016) 
(“[T]he Court’s ‘valid interest’ language will doubtless cause confusion and disagreement.”).  
The HUD 2016 Guidance makes no mention of this subtle difference:  It restates the language 
in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 and also cites to Texas v. Inclusive Communities for support. See HUD 
GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2. 
 153. See Bagenstos, supra note 152, at 1141 (“Whether the opinion effects a meaningful 
weakening of the burden of justifying practices with a disparate impact will only become 
apparent with time.”). 
 154. HUD administrative judges will likely follow HUD regulations and guidance, absent 
from which are the limitations imposed by the Court. See Taibl, supra note 152; Tex. v. 
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2549 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The effect of these regulations, 
not surprisingly, is to confer enormous discretion on HUD—without actually solving the 
problem.  What is a ‘substantial’ interest?  Is there a difference between a ‘legitimate’ interest 
and a ‘nondiscriminatory’ interest?  To what degree must an interest be met for a practice to 
be ‘necessary’?  How are parties and courts to measure ‘discriminatory effect’?”). 
 155. New litigation brought in the courts may lead to a challenge of the recent 2016 
guidance as overstepping constitutional limits by being overly broad when failing to mention 
the “safeguards” established in Texas v. Inclusive Communities, and thus being inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FHA. See infra Section II.A. 
 156. See Amy M. Glassman & Shanellah Verna, Disparate Impact One Year After 
Inclusive Communities, 25 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 11, 12 (2016) (“Although there 
have been a range of disparate impact claims since ICP, our review of those cases suggests 
that the guidance of the ICP case is creating difficulty for many plaintiffs to make a prima 
facie showing of disparate impact.”). 
 157. See infra Section I.F. 
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F. State Action to Address Discrimination in Criminal History 
Screening 
Some states have taken the initiative to provide further guidance to 
housing managers and owners regarding the permissible use of criminal 
histories in housing policies.  In April of 2016, New York State’s Division 
of Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) issued a memorandum 
explaining and clarifying the new HUD guidance and how it applies to all 
housing companies, owners, managing agents, and site managers in the 
state.158  This memorandum requires housing companies that screen for 
criminal histories to establish policies and standards by which an 
individualized assessment is conducted, weighing factors such as:  “(a) 
seriousness of the crime, (b) the time elapsed since the offense, (c) the age 
of the applicant at the time of the crime, (d) evidence of the applicant’s 
rehabilitation and (e) whether they are an actual danger to their 
neighbors.”159 
DHCR issued further requirements specific to state-funded housing 
providers.  First, DHCR requires that these housing providers complete a 
worksheet when reviewing an applicant with a criminal history.160  This 
worksheet contains a series of questions that address the individualized 
assessment factors described above.161  The worksheet serves two purposes:  
(1) it creates a written record of the decision making process, allowing the 
housing provider to make consistent decisions and the applicant to 
understand the reasons for the decision;162 and (2) it ensures housing 
providers consider all relevant factors when making their decision.163  
Second, DHCR issued accompanying guidance to this worksheet to assist 
state-funded housing providers.164  This guidance outlined general policies 
for housing providers that detail how to conduct an individualized 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See MEMORANDUM RE:  ACCESS TO REDUCING HOUSING BARRIERS FOR NEW YORKERS 
WITH CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, DHCR, (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/
Offices/HousingOperations/2016-B-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML6V-APGX]. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See WORKSHEET FOR APPLYING NEW YORK STATE’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 
WHEN ASSESSING APPLICANTS FOR STATE-FUNDED HOUSING WHO HAVE CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS, DHCR (May 2016), [hereinafter NY CRIMINAL WORKSHEET] 
http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/Offices/FairHousing/GPCC_Worksheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F9C6-X4YU]. 
 161. See id. 
 162. This also creates a record of evidence that may assist plaintiffs in ensuing litigation, 
or unearth patterns of discrimination from particular housing providers. 
 163. See GUIDE FOR APPLYING NEW YORK STATE’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES WHEN 
ASSESSING APPLICANTS FOR STATE-FUNDED HOUSING WHO HAVE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, 
DHCR 2, (May 2016), [hereinafter DHCR 2016 GUIDE] http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/
Offices/FairHousing/GPCC_Guidance_Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V24-MBMQ]. 
 164. See id. 
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assessment, specific requirements on how to maintain a record of all 
applications, and an explanation of how to complete the worksheet and 
appropriately consider the relevant factors.165 
The Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”) in March of 2016 
amended its criminal background procedure, which used to ban housing 
assistance to individuals with criminal records.166  HANO’s new policy 
applies to HANO-managed public housing sites, third-party managed public 
housing sites, and the Housing Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”).167  The 
policy explicitly states that “[t]here is absolutely no presumption that an 
applicant with a criminal conviction should be denied housing assistance.  
Before making a decision to admit or deny applicants with criminal 
convictions, they shall be given an individualized review based on accurate 
information, including notice and opportunity to be heard.”168  HANO 
requires a two-step process that first assesses criminal convictions using 
what they call “the Grid” (categories of crimes and lookback periods that 
require further review); and second, conducts an individualized assessment 
of applications who require further review.169 
The screening process determines if an applicant is deemed eligible, or if 
an applicant requires further review by referencing the Grid.170  Then the 
further review is conducted by a three-person panel—two senior HANO 
officials and a resident representative—established by HANO and each 
manager.171  The panel is to consider, at a minimum, the number of 
convictions, nature of convictions, time since release, rehabilitation, 
community ties and support, and employment history of the individual.172  
Importantly, applicants are notified in writing when further review is 
necessary, and have the opportunity to “dispute the accuracy of the 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See id. at 2-5. 
 166. See Richard Webster, HANO Approves New Criminal Background Check Policy, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/03/hano_
approves_new_criminal_bac.html [https://perma.cc/8CEP-VAGG]. 
 167. See HANO CRIMINAL BACKGROUND SCREENING PROCEDURES 1 (Draft 2/5/2016), 
[hereinafter HANO PROCEDURES] https://www.hano.org/home/agency_plans/CRIMINAL
%20BACKGROUND%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20POSTING%2002.05.16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7CL-36UX]. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id.  Technically, if a crime does not require further review, the applicant is deemed 
eligible.  However, all crime categories listed on the Grid require further review, but some 
crimes are limited to a look-back period of three years from conviction and one year from 
release. See A Conversation with HUD, supra note 101, at slide 23; see also HANO 
PROCEDURES, supra note 167, at 2-3.  However, these look-back periods are shorter than the 
standard five to seven year lookback period. See A Conversation with HUD, supra note 101. 
 171. HANO PROCEDURES, supra note 167, at 5 (“HANO will coordinate with community 
partners to develop and deliver the training [to panel members].”). 
 172. See id. at 6-8. 
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conviction information” before the review is undertaken.173  If an applicant 
is denied, she is entitled to appeal the decision but not the process.174  HANO 
and managers must keep a record of every decision made, and every six 
months HANO must publish a report on the further review process’ data and 
outcomes.175 
These state actions to clarify criminal history housing procedures and 
enhance protections against discrimination for formerly incarcerated persons 
are meaningful steps.  However, it is important to note that these DHCR and 
HANO procedures generally apply only to state-funded housing providers 
and programs, not private housing providers.176 
II.  FRAMEWORKS FOR ADDRESSING HOUSING ISSUES FACED BY 
FORMERLY INCARCERATED PEOPLE 
Section II.A discusses the current disparate impact litigation regime, and 
its inadequacies in addressing the issues formerly incarcerated individuals 
face regarding access to stable, safe, affordable housing.  Section II.B 
explores the designation of protected class status for formerly incarcerated 
individuals.  The Section ultimately concludes that this solution is still rooted 
in a litigation framework and is thus subject to the same problems.  
Moreover, the feasibility of such a designation is questionable.  Section II.C 
examines the PFS model as a way to supplement the current disparate impact 
litigation regime.  The Section concludes the PFS model is the most viable 
remedy for combatting the barriers formerly incarcerated people face in 
securing housing. 
A. The Disparate Impact Fix:  The Current Model Does Not 
Adequately Address Problems Faced by Formerly Incarcerated People 
Disparate impact litigation alone is incapable of securing housing for, and 
combatting the volume of housing discrimination against, formerly 
incarcerated people for several reasons.  While disparate impact liability is, 
in theory, hugely beneficial for assisting formerly incarcerated people in 
challenging discrimination, it falls short in practice.177  When Texas v. 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at 6. 
 174. See id. at 7. 
 175. See id. at 8. 
 176. See NY CRIMINAL WORKSHEET, supra note 160; HANO PROCEDURES, supra note 167; 
see also NHLP BULLETIN, supra note 104, at 60 (“Private housing represents 97% of the total 
housing stock in the United States.”). 
 177. This is not to say that disparate impact, in general, is not an important tool; it is a very 
important “mechanism for fighting segregation by prohibiting housing practices that 
inadvertently have a disproportionate effect on minority populations and perpetuate 
residential segregation.” Cornelius J. Murray IV, Promoting “Inclusive Communities:”  A 
Modified Approach to Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 75 LA. L. REV. 213, 236 
(2014). 
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Inclusive Communities was decided, advocates saw the decision as a 
victory.178  At last, the Supreme Court recognized liability under the 
disparate impact theory.179 
However, in the past forty years, plaintiffs have had limited success when 
litigating disparate impact claims under the FHA.180  Some scholars argued 
that this lack of success was due to an unclear standard “as well as the 
theory’s use as a ‘Plan B’ to disparate treatment claims.”181  Now, some 
scholars argue that the Court’s imposition of significant limitations on 
establishing such a prima facie case will pose significant barriers to the 
commencement of these private actions.182  In fact, the first court to hear a 
case183 under the Texas v. Inclusive Communities disparate impact 
framework granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because 
the plaintiff failed to meet the pleading requirements.184  In the past year 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See, e.g., Victory! Supreme Court Upholds Key Protections of Fair Housing Act, 
LAMBDA LEGAL (June 2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20160625_victory-fha 
[https://perma.cc/JNX4-FB6N]. 
 179. See Patterson, supra note 51, at 213. 
 180. See Murray IV, supra note 177, at 216 n.20 (citing Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is 
Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate 
Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 393 (2013) (“What is 
abundantly clear when analyzing the FHA disparate impact case law over the past forty years 
is that the appellate courts have had little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate impact 
claims under the FHA . . . . plaintiffs have received positive decisions in less than 20%, or 
eighteen of the ninety-two FHA disparate impact claims considered on appeal.”)). 
 181. Murray IV, supra note 177, at 216 n.21, n.23 (citing Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward A 
Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 774-75 (2009); Stacy E. 
Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?:  Stuck on State 
of Mind in Anti-Discrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1148-49 (2007); 
Seicshnaydre, supra note 180, at 393). 
 182. See S. Lamar Gardner, #Blacklivesmatter, Disparate-Impact, and the Property 
Agenda, 43 S.U. L. REV. 321, 325 (2016) (“[S]uch a strong causality requirement significantly 
reduces the number of persons who might be able to prevail under a disparate-impact housing 
discrimination claim.  This high bar, in turn, has the potential to shut down many legitimate 
claims of housing discrimination in instances where the practices and policies of the defendant 
are engineered so as to be particularly difficult to directly and strongly connect to the 
discriminatory effect so produced.”); J. William Callison, Inclusive Communities:  
Geographic Desegregation, Urban Revitalization, and Disparate Impact Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (2016) (“[W]hile Inclusive Communities did not 
eliminate disparate impact as a cause of action under the FHA, it severely limited the scope 
of the theory and expanded the discretion of the policy-making defendant.”). See generally 
Glassman & Verna, supra note 156, at 16-24 (providing an overview of current cases since 
the IPC decision). 
 183. City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co, No. 2:13-CV-09007, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93451 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). 
 184. See id.  Plaintiff, Los Angeles, alleged that Wells Fargo engaged in patterns and 
practices such as redlining and reverse redlining which resulted in both intentional and 
disparate impact discrimination. See id.  On summary judgment, the court ruled that Los 
Angeles failed to state a prima facie case due to a lack of quantitative evidence supporting the 
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since the Texas v. Inclusive Communities decision, several other disparate 
impact cases have also faced real challenges meeting these pleading 
requirements.185 
Fortune Society, Inc. v. Sandcastle Towers Housing Development Fund 
Corp.186 and Alexander v. Edgewood Management Corp.187 are two cases at 
bar that are examining this framework as applied to formerly incarcerated 
persons.  Thus far, both have survived the more stringent pleading 
requirements stage; however, both are only in the early stages of litigation. 
In Fortune Society v. Sandcastle, Fortune Society challenged Sandcastle 
Towers’ criminal history policy.188  Fortune Society alleged the policy 
constitutes a blanket ban against those with felony records and thus violates 
the FHA under the disparate impact theory as it disproportionality affects 
people of color.189  Sandcastle Towers insisted there was no blanket ban, 
citing a handful of approved applications of tenants with misdemeanors.190  
Additionally, they claimed there was no disparate impact as people of color 
comprised seventy percent of the building.191  They further asserted that 
convicted criminals are not a protected class, and plaintiffs were 
“impermissibly seeking to challenge the criminal justice system and the 
alleged racial disparity therein indirectly by and through Defendants.”192 
The United States filed a statement of interest which asserts that “[i]t is 
blackletter law under both Title VII and the FHA that the absence of racial 
disparities in the final results of a multi-step process—at the bottom line—
                                                                                                                 
disparate impact claims, and the city’s failure to identify artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary 
policies of Wells Fargo that produced the disparate impact. See id. 
 185. See, e.g., Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E. 3d 394 (Mass. 
2016); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045(SRN/SER), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
40750 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016); Azam v. City of Columbia Heights, No. CV 14-1044 
(JRT/BRT), 2016 WL 424966 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2016). But see Long Island Hous. Servs., 
Inc. v. Nassau Cty. Indus. Dev. Agency, No. 14-CV-3307, 2015 WL 7756122 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
1, 2015); R.I. Comm’n for Hum. Rts. v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110 (D.R.I. 2015). 
 186. 1:14-cv-6410 (E.D.N.Y.). 
 187. 1:15-cv-01140-RCL (D.D.C.). 
 188. 1:14-cv-6410. 
 189. See First Amended Complaint at 1-2, Dkt. No. 30, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle; see 
also Transcript for Motion Hearing at 20:13-15, Dkt. No. 66, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle 
(“But what the truth seeking function has produced is 35 emails that say in writing there is a 
blanket ban.  They say no criminal background.”). 
 190. See Answer at 11 ¶ 87, Dkt. No. 37, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle; see also, United 
States of America’s Statement of Interest at 3-4, Dkt. No. 102, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle 
(“Plaintiff also analyzed the Sandcastle’s accepted application files and found evidence of no 
more than six accepted tenants with non-traffic-related criminal convictions in the past 
decade.”). 
 191. See United States of America’s Statement of Interest, Dkt. No. 102 at 5, Fortune Soc’y 
v. Sandcastle. 
 192. Answer at 11 ¶ 81, Dkt. No. 37, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle. 
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does not excuse discrimination at a particular step of the process.”193  
Sandcastle Tower’s reply accused the United States of lacking impartiality 
in their statement of interest, and alleged it resembles “an intervenor’s 
memorandum of law.”194  Sandcastle Towers also asserted that the United 
States analysis is “only relevant should this court factually determine a 
blanket ban exists.”195  Sandcastle filed a letter to request a pre-motion 
hearing regarding their anticipated motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Fortune Society lacked standing.196  No 
pre-motion hearing was granted.197 Subsequently, the parties have submitted 
supplemental briefing on this issue.198  Interestingly, Sandcastle’s recent 
reply briefs reassert that formerly incarcerated people are not a protected 
class, and that the Fortune Society lacks organizational standing.199  The 
Fortune Society has requested oral arguments be heard on this issue.200  In 
their opposition brief the Fortune Society argues, among other things, that it 
does have organizational standing, and even if defendant’s views of the facts 
were correct, they still would have standing because the defendant’s conduct 
injured them.201  In its sur-reply, Fortune Society further asserts that 
                                                                                                                 
 193. United States of America’s Statement of Interest at 11-12, Dkt. No. 102, Fortune 
Soc’y v. Sandcastle (“Based on just such reasoning, a federal district court recently rejected 
an attempt to defend against an FHA disparate impact challenge to a criminal records policy 
based on the fact that the tenants at the complexes at issue were predominately (and, in one 
case, exclusively) African-American.”) (citing Alexander v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., No. 
1:15-cv-01140-RCL, 2016 WL 5957673, at *3 (D.D.C. July 25, 2016)); see also Betsey v. 
Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987-88 (4th Cir. 1984); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 456 (1982). 
 194. Brief in Response to the Submission of the United States of America at 1, Dkt. No. 
106, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle. 
 195. Id. at 2. 
 196. See Letter re:  Pre-Motion Conference for Anticipated Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 
111, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle. 
 197. See Order Denying Motion for Pre Motion Conference, Jan. 26, 2017, Fortune Soc’y 
v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410). 
 198. See Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Dismissal for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 115, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410); Plaintiff’s 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Dismissal of the Action 
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 116, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-
6410); Defendant’s Reply Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Dismissal of the Action 
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 119, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-
6410). 
 199. See Defendant’s Reply Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Dismissal of the 
Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 119, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle 
(1:14-cv-6410); see Defendant’s Brief in Response to Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply Brief Submitted 
in Further Support of Dismissal of the Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 1, 
Dkt. No. 125, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410). 
 200. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of 
Dismissal of the Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 1, Dkt. No. 116, Fortune 
Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410). 
 201. See id. at 9-14, 19-25. 
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defendants mischaracterize FHA standing requirements.202  The court has 
not ruled on this issue as of yet.203 
Alexander v. Edgewood involves a challenge to Edgewood Management’s 
and Community Preservation Development’s criminal history policies under 
the disparate impact theory.204  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and 
argued that their building is comprised of almost one hundred percent people 
of color and, thus, there is no statistical disparity and no disparate impact.205  
In denying the motion,206 Judge Lamberth explained that “[i]n order to 
prevail in a discriminatory impact case under Title VII, plaintiffs, members 
of a discrete minority, are required to prove only that a given policy has a 
discriminatory impact on them as individuals.”207  Thus, Mr. Alexander had 
stated a prima facie case, and defendant’s broad criminal history policy may 
violate HUD’s 2016 guidance.208  In their answer to the amended complaint, 
defendants asserted affirmative defenses, including that the plaintiff’s 
application was denied for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, and that the 
guidelines the plaintiff seeks to enforce are beyond the legislative or 
constitutional authority of one or more governmental and promulgating 
entities.209  Most recently, the defendants filed a motion to sever arguing 
joinder was improper.210  The parties have agreed to stay discovery until this 
motion has been adjudicated.211 
There is no way to accurately predict the outcomes of these cases or the 
ramifications these decisions may have on disparate impact litigation under 
the FHA for formerly incarcerated plaintiffs.  However, several cases, 
including Alexander v. Edgewood, call into question the constitutionality of 
HUD’s 2013 regulation and 2016 guidance.212  In one case concerning the 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support 
of Dismissal of the Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 7, Dkt. No. 122, Fortune 
Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410). 
 203. See Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410) docket. 
 204. See 1:15-cv-01140-RCL. 
 205. See East Capital Senior Rental LP’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 17-1 at 10, 
Alexander v. Edgewood Management Co. (D.D.C.) (1:15-cv-01140-RCL). 
 206. See Order, Dkt. No. 36, Alexander v. Edgewood. 
 207. Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. No. 35 at 5-6, Alexander v. Edgewood, (quoting Betsey 
v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added). 
 208. See id. at 8. 
 209. Answer to Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 38 at 13, Alexander v. Edgewood; see also 
Defendants A&R Management Inc. & East Capitol Senior Rental LP’s Answer to Amended 
Complaint, Dkt. No. 37, Alexander v. Edgewood. 
 210. See Defendants A&R Management’s Motion to Sever, Dkt. No. 44, Alexander v. 
Edgewood; see also Reply in Support of Defendants A&R Management’s Motion to Sever, 
Dkt. No. 51, Alexander v. Edgewood. 
 211. See Unopposed Motion to Stay Discovery, Dkt. No. 54, Alexander v. Edgewood. 
 212. See supra note 210; see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 1:13-
cv-966 (RJL), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015). 
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extension of liability to the pricing of homeowner insurance under HUD’s 
2013 regulation, plaintiffs argued that the disparate-impact rule extends 
beyond HUD’s statutory authority under the FHA as interpreted by the Court 
in Texas v. Inclusive Communities.213  With the single party control of the 
Presidency and Congress, the appointment of Justice Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court (and possible other conservative appointments to come), and 
the appointment of Ben Carson as HUD Secretary, one may speculate that a 
constitutional challenge against these HUD regulations and guidance will 
result in an unfavorable outcome for fair-housing advocates.214 
In addition to the limited historical success of disparate impact claims, the 
more stringent pleading requirements under Texas v. Inclusive Communities 
and the potential for HUD’s 2013 regulation and 2016 guidance to be 
successfully challenged only increase the barriers and burdens surrounding 
litigation.  This litigation model places an additional undue burden on 
disadvantaged individuals to bring claims in court.215  A victim of such 
discrimination typically does not have enough resources to hire an expert 
who can develop the statistical analysis that is often necessary to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact.216  As a result, many claims cannot 
survive the summary judgment stage and are dismissed.217  Moreover, any 
success is case specific to the individual plaintiff and housing provider.218 
Taking into account these barriers, burdens, and limitations, the current 
disparate impact litigation regime does not adequately combat the incredible 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Dkt. No. 57, at ¶¶ 6, 
8, Am. Ins. v. HUD, 1:13-cv-00966 (RJL) (“The Disparate-Impact Rule also runs afoul of 
other limits announced in Inclusive Communities.  For example, the Rule contemplates that a 
plaintiff may state a prima facie claim based on a statistical disparity alone, without showing 
that a policy or practice of the defendant actually caused the alleged disparity. See, e.g., 78 
Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,469.  The Rule also purports to allow a disparate-impact plaintiff to 
prevail by showing simply that the defendant’s stated interest in the policy or practice at issue 
could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect, even if the policy or 
practice is valid and does not present an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier. See id. 
at 11,482 (24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3)).”). 
 214. See infra notes 409-11.  If a case were to successfully challenge the current HUD 
regulations on a constitutional basis, given Carson’s stated opinions about government 
agencies’ “social engineering” practices, under his leadership it is unlikely that HUD would 
challenge such a ruling. 
 215. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 180, at 392. 
 216. See id.; see, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate 
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very rare for plaintiffs other 
than highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to 
prevail under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.”). 
 217. See id. 
 218. See HUD 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 7. 
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volume of housing discrimination that occurs every single year.219  The next 
two sections will propose potential remedies to this ineffective model. 
B. The Equal Protection Fix:  Making Formerly Incarcerated People 
a Protected Class 
Section II.B.1 examines arguments for granting protected class status to 
formerly incarcerated individuals.  Section II.B.2 concludes such protected 
class status designation will still ultimately face similar problems as the 
disparate impact framework, for it is still rooted in the litigation regime.  
Moreover, the feasibility of this solution is questionable. 
1. The Case for Making Formerly Incarcerated People a Protected Class 
Formerly incarcerated people exhibit many of the characteristics 
deserving of a federally protected class as established by the Court in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.:220  “immutability, political powerlessness, 
and a history of class-based discrimination.”221  Even after serving their 
sentences, formerly incarcerated people continue to face collateral 
consequences that restrict their rights and freedoms beyond those restrictions 
ordinary citizens face.222  A growing number of scholars support the idea that 
these collateral consequences “generated by structural inequality, social 
stigma, criminal and civil penalties, and improved information technology, 
combine to create ex-offenders’ second-class citizenship.”223  One scholar, 
Ben Geiger, advocates that formerly incarcerated people should be a 
protected class because (1) “ex offender class” is created by government 
policies that do not allow alteration, and thus “ex-offender” status is 
immutable;224 (2) “ex offenders” are discrete225 and insular226 minorities that 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., The State of Fair Housing:  FY 
2008 Annual Report on Fair Housing 2 (2009), http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/
fy2008annual-rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GG4-XVBX] (“Each year, tens of thousands of FHA 
complaints are filed, and these complaints represent ‘only a fraction of instances of housing 
discrimination’ that actually occur annually, which is estimated to be about 4,000,000.”)). 
 220. 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938). 
 221. Geiger, supra note 78, at 1207 (referring to U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, n.4 (1938)). 
 222. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 67, at 267. 
 223. Geiger, supra note 78, at 1194. 
 224. See id. at 1219 (“Overall, only a fraction of states allow for some form of clearing of 
post-conviction records, and even those few states impose significant administrative and 
evidentiary hurdles to legally available remedies.  Thus, having a criminal record qualifies as 
an unalterable classification for purposes of the suspectness inquiry.”). 
 225. See id. at 1226 (explaining formerly incarcerated people are distinct and easily 
identifiable with the advent of new and inexpensive technology). 
 226. See id. 1228 (explaining that when incarcerated they are incredibly insulated, and an 
argument that claims they are diffuse once released “should not remove them as candidates 
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lack access to political power;227 and (3) there is a history of discrimination 
against “ex offenders.”228 
However, the classification of formerly incarcerated people as a protected 
class can be challenged on at least two bases.  First, as to the political process, 
the Fourteenth Amendment permits the disenfranchisement of formerly 
incarcerated people.229  The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant 
part, “[b]ut when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation shall be reduced.”230  However, some scholars argue that 
the plain text reading and legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment 
suggest the framers did not intend that those who could be denied voting 
rights could also be denied civil rights.231  As such, a reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that grants states the power to deprive other rights 
to formerly incarcerated people, such as certain collateral consequences, is 
overly broad.232 
Second, critics assert that unlike immutable characteristics such as race, 
formerly incarcerated people are morally culpable and responsible for their 
status.233  Analyzed in a vacuum, this statement may be true.  However, 
scholars argue that “like Jim Crow (and slavery), mass incarceration operates 
as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and institutions that 
operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a group defined 
largely by race.”234  This is at least in part attributable to a “racialized justice 
                                                                                                                 
for heightened scrutiny” because the fears of the populous and legislators around their 
diffusion fuel legislative actions against them as a class). 
 227. See id. at 1191 (“Ex-offenders are not just marginalized, they are also a clear example 
of repeat losers in pluralist politics.  Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised.”). 
 228. Id. at 1225 (although America never formerly adopted the “civil death” of English 
common law, formerly incarcerated people have always faced discrimination in this country). 
 229. See id.; see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 24 (1974) (holding that denying 
the right to vote to convicted felons who had completed their sentences and paroles did not 
deny equal protection). 
 230. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
 231. Geiger, supra note 78, at 1237 (“To the contrary, the framers specifically designed 
the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee Freedmen civil equality without extending political 
equality.”). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. at 1192. 
 234. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow:  How the War on Drugs Gave Birth to a 
Permanent American Undercaste, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.huffington
post.com/michelle-alexander/the-new-jim-crow-how-the_b_490386.html 
[https://perma.cc/QFK6-R92W]; see also Lyles-Chockley, supra note 67, at 269 (“Upon 
reentry into their communities, black ex-offenders are faced with a double stigma of having 
been incarcerated and of being black . . . . In general, offenders are assumed to be dangerous, 
aggressive, and unworthy of trust, and upon release are met with suspicion and hostility.  
Black offenders are additionally often assumed to be unintelligent, lazy, and dishonest.  The 
misinterpretation of crime statistics exacerbates the stigma borne by black ex-offenders.”). 
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system that disadvantages and targets people of color.”235  Thus, when one 
takes into account the history of mass incarceration,236 the limits imposed by 
poverty,237 the unfair targeting of people of color by law enforcement,238 the 
lack of access to justice in the courts,239 and the type and degree of the crimes 
and mere arrests that may put an individual in this category,240 creating a 
protected class may help mitigate the dual barriers of discrimination 
offenders of color face.241 
As it stands today, formerly incarcerated people are not considered a 
suspect class and thus, do not garner heightened judicial attention when they 
challenge discriminatory policies.242  While unlikely,243 if formerly 
incarcerated people were granted protected class status, Geiger argues, they 
would meet the criteria for heightened scrutiny244 under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.245  Heightened scrutiny may be called 
for when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”246 
2. Creating a Protected Class Will Not Adequately Address the Access to 
Housing and Housing Discrimination Problems Faced By Formerly 
Incarcerated People 
Creating a federally protected class is unlikely to provide greater 
antidiscrimination protection beyond what already exists under the disparate 
treatment and disparate impact theories.  First, the Court has not recognized 
housing as a fundamental right.  As it currently stands, a claim cannot be 
brought using the Equal Protection framework of the Due Process Clause.  
In terms of the future, it remains unlikely that courts will ever view housing 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Newman, supra note 37, at 135 n.81. 
 236. See supra Part I. 
 237. See supra Section I.A. 
 238. See Newman, supra note 37, at 134-35. 
 239. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 180, at 392. 
 240. See supra Section I.D. 
 241. See Jenny Bourne, Black People Face Double Discrimination, INST. OF RACE REL. 
(Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.irr.org.uk/news/black-people-face-double-discrimination/ 
[https://perma.cc/434C-ZSSZ]. 
 242. See Geiger, supra note 78, at 1191. 
 243. It is probably not a politically viable option for legislators to advocate for protected 
class status for formerly incarcerated people. 
 244. Heightened (or intermediate) scrutiny is used to review laws that classify on the basis 
of gender and other suspect-classes. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  This 
standard of review requires that the government show the classification is substantially related 
to an important governmental justification. See id. 
 245. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Geiger, supra note 78, at 1217. 
 246. U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938). 
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as a liberty interest rising to the level of a fundamental right.247  It is equally 
unlikely that the federal courts would consider housing to be a “traditionally 
understood right.”248  At the state level, New York is the only jurisdiction 
that provides a fundamental right to shelter.249  Internationally, the United 
Nations considers the right to shelter a universal human right.250  
Nevertheless, the right to housing is still not protected under the United 
States Constitution. 
However, states can create protected classes beyond those enumerated by 
the federal government.  New York currently has more protected classes than 
what is required at the federal level, including protections based on age, 
marital status, military status, sexual orientation, and source of income, in 
some jurisdictions like New York City, Buffalo, and West Seneca, as well as 
Nassau, Westchester, and Suffolk counties.251  If New York were to create a 
protected class for formerly incarcerated persons under the state’s Human 
Rights Law, many housing policies that facially discriminate on the basis of 
criminal history likely could be challenged under the disparate treatment 
framework.252 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See Geiger, supra note 78, at 1217.  Collateral consequences, like housing barriers, 
are infringements which are “social or economic in nature, [thus] they violate no fundamental 
right for equal-protection purposes.” Id.  Employment, a liberty interest that is protected by 
the due process clause, is not considered a fundamental right.  Seeing as the courts have used 
an analogous framework for housing by adopting the Title VII disparate impact theory, it is 
unlikely they would give more protections under the due process clause to housing than to 
employment. 
 248. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (explaining that traditional rights are 
those that are deeply rooted in the country’s history). 
 249. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (“[T]he aid, care and support of the needy are public 
concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions.”).  In Callahan v. 
Carey, a New York State Supreme Court Justice declared the City was required to provide 
shelter for homeless men.  Clearly this right to shelter extends to the homeless, but it is not 
clear this right would extend to formerly incarcerated people (unless they too were homeless). 
See Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979). 
 250. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978), at art. 11; Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. 27; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195, at art. 5; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, at art. 14; American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), at art. XI. 
 251. See N.Y.S. Human Rights Law § 292; Fair Housing FAQ’s, DHCR, 
http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/Offices/FairHousing/FEHOfaqs.htm#whoisprotected 
[https://perma.cc/FV83-RCLY]. 
 252. A case of disparate treatment under the FHA “refers to housing practices that 
intentionally treat similarly situated persons differently.  In other words, a practice qualifies 
as disparate treatment if it applies rules to a protected set of people that are different from the 
rules that it applies to others.” Murray IV, supra note 177, at n.40. 
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There are both benefits and drawbacks to this approach.  The benefit is 
that victims of discrimination based on their criminal histories could make 
two claims as opposed to one claim, which may increase their chances of 
success.  However, the creation of a protected class could lead to perverse 
effects whereby housing providers participate in unwritten practices—in an 
attempt to avoid disparate treatment liability—that exclude people of color 
because they are statistically more likely to be criminals.253  Historically, it 
has been incredibly difficult to prove explicit discriminatory intent in such 
instances.254  These plaintiffs would then be in the same or a worse position 
as before, and would have to bring a disparate impact claim to challenge this 
practice.  Additionally, the disparate treatment framework, like the disparate 
impact framework, is still rooted in the litigation regime.  As such, similar 
issues discussed earlier would still apply.255 
C. The Local Fix:  The Case for Pay for Success Implementation in 
States and Municipalities 
The Pay-For-Success (“PFS”) model, in conjunction with the use of social 
impact bonds (“SIBs”),256 can be used as a tool to provide much needed 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical 
Discrimination:  A Field Experiment, U. MICH. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER NO. 16-012 (2016) 
(finding that “ban the box” legislation enacted to prevent employers from reviewing criminal 
histories at the initial stages of the interview process has resulted in more discrimination 
against people of color.  Employers have begun to refuse to hire people of color because it is 
statistically more likely they have a criminal record.  Instead of eliminating barriers, this 
legislation might be responsible, in some cases, for making discrimination against people of 
color and formerly incarcerated people worse). 
 254. See John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance:  An Update and the 
Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 171 n.165 (2002) (citing 
United States v. Real Est. Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (“The Court 
recognizes that ‘most persons will not admit publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice 
against members of the Negro Race.’”)); Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 
612 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[I]t is unusual that a [FHA defendant] will openly reveal that he or she 
acted on the basis of discriminatory intent.”) (quoting Horizon Hous. Dev. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. 
of Upper Southhampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1992)). 
 255. See supra Section II.A. 
 256. See Frequently Asked Questions:  Pay for Success/Social Impact Bonds, NONPROFIT 
FIN. FUND 1, [hereinafter PFS FAQ] http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn-out-loud/pfs-faq/ 
[https://perma.cc/NJ3Y-BXGZ].  The difference between PFS and SIBs is that PFS “refer[s] 
to outcomes-oriented contracts” whereas SIBs “refer to specific financing arrangements with 
upfront funding provided by private investors.” Id.  Other forms of financing arrangements 
can also be used, such as outcomes-oriented performance loans and performance based 
contracts. See id.; see also Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention Programs 
with Social Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 964 (2012) (“In typical 
government-funded social programs, risk of economic loss from unsuccessful programs lies 
with government; in a pure PFS arrangement, that risk is shifted to the service-providing 
nonprofit organization (‘NPO’).  The benefit of the SIB in conjunction with a PFS contract is 
that risk of loss is transferred to the private sector and away from financially fragile NPOs.”); 
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housing options for formerly incarcerated people.  PFS projects are “multi-
stakeholder partnerships that typically involve the public, private and 
nonprofit sectors.”257  In PFS projects, a back-end payor (often the 
government, a foundation, insurance provider, or hospital) contracts with 
one or multiple service providers and agrees to pay for outcomes (as opposed 
to amount of work done).258  SIBs help provide initial funding for PFS 
programs.  Private investors, both commercial and philanthropic, provide the 
program with the upfront capital needed to fund the service, and the back-
end payor only repays these investors when the contractually agreed upon 
outcomes come to fruition.259  Thus, tax payers’ dollars are only spent to pay 
back investors on programs that generate positive outcomes.260  This way of 
funding social services is “ultimately aimed at reducing the costs associated 
with meeting critical needs by addressing problems early and effectively.”261 
Private investment in these programs is a form of “impact investing”262—
providing investors with both a financial and social return.263  Importantly, 
private investors have a growing interest in impact investing.264  According 
to one study, “6 in 10 wealthy individuals feel that they can have some 
influence on society by how they invest, and 45 percent agree that how they 
invest is a way to express their social, political and environmental values.”265  
Also, forty-six percent would be willing to accept a lower return from their 
investment if the impact is great and positive, and forty-four percent would 
                                                                                                                 
Max Liang et al., An Overview of Social Impact Bonds, 13 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 267 (2014) 
(discussing whether it is accurate to call SIBs bonds). 
 257. Pay for Success 101, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND [hereinafter PFS 101], 
http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn/basics/ [https://perma.cc/D6JD-CR68]; see also Invest in 
What Works:  Pay for Success, RESULTS FOR AM., (Aug. 18, 2015), http://results4
america.org/policy-hub/invest-works-fact-sheet-social-impact-bonds/ 
[https://perma.cc/GL6Z-Q8LW]. 
 258. See PFS 101, supra note 257. 
 259. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 1. 
 260. See id. 
 261. Id. at 3. 
 262. Jennifer Miller Oertel et al., Proving That They Are Doing Good:  What Attorneys and 
Other Advisers Need to Know About Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693, 701 (2013) 
(“‘[I]mpact investing”—has evolved over centuries, when public and private sector groups 
began investing in emerging market enterprises to fight poverty.”). 
 263. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 5. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Tracy Palandjian & Jane Hughes, The Social Impact Bond Market:  Three Scenarios 
for the Future, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 19, 2013), https://ssir.org/articles/
entry/the_social_impact_bond_market_three_scenarios_for_the_future 
[https://perma.cc/73XP-EG87]. 
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even be willing to take on a higher risk.266  Large financial institutions such 
as Goldman Sachs support and promote this kind of impact investing.267 
The PFS model is unique.  The first project was launched in the United 
Kingdom in 2010.268  The United States soon followed with the first project 
launched in New York in 2012.269  Over thirty states in the U.S. have begun 
to explore the PFS model and several have launched projects addressing a 
wide range of issues, from homelessness to recidivism to early childhood 
education.270 
1. The Structure of Pay for Success 
A PFS project typically involves the following actors:  (1) a government 
contracting authority; (2) social service provider(s); (3) private investors; (4) 
an intermediary; and (5) an independent evaluator.271  The government 
engages in a pay for success contract whereby it agrees to pay back investors, 
plus some agreed upon return, if it receives independent evidence that the 
agreed upon targets and goals have been met by a certain date.272  The social 
service provider agrees to this contract and works to achieve the target goals 
within the specified time frame.273  The private investor finances the program 
(usually through SIBs) and agrees to only be repaid if targets are achieved.274  
The intermediary borrows the money from the private investors, distributes 
the money (through SIB loans) to the social service providers, and monitors 
and provides general oversight regarding the flow of funds to providers, 
investors, and the contracting government authority.275  The independent 
                                                                                                                 
 266. See id. 
 267. Macroeconomic Insights Social Impact Bonds, GOLDMAN SACHS (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/social-impact-bonds.html 
[https://perma.cc/2Q3R-548R]. 
 268. See Rebeca Leventhal, Effecting Progress:  Using Social Impact Bonds to Finance 
Social Services, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 516 (2013); Liang et al., supra note 256, at 269 
(SIBs were used to fund a recidivism project at Peterborough Prison:  “as of June 2013, 
preliminary results showed that the Peterborough bond has been successful in reducing the 
re-conviction rate by 23% relative to the comparison group.”). 
 269. See PFS 101, supra note 257; Leventhal, supra note 268, at 515. 
 270. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 2 (“In 2015, new projects are expected to launch in 
California, Ohio, South Carolina, Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, New York, Massachusetts, 
and Connecticut.  The UK has 16 projects underway and projects have launched or are 
developing in Canada, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, and India, among other countries.”); see 
also Pay for Success U.S. Activity, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, http://www.payforsuccess.org/pay-
success-deals-united-states [https://perma.cc/Q29S-QLRL]. 
 271. See Deborah Burand, Globalizing Social Finance:  How Social Impact Bonds and 
Social Impact Performance Guarantees can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447, 
452-53 (2013). 
 272. See id. at 452. 
 273. See id. at 453. 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. 
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evaluator assesses and determines whether the targets have been met by the 
prescribed time in accordance with the contract.276  If these targets have been 
met, the investors are repaid, and if they are not met, the investors are not 
repaid.277 
2. The Benefits of Pay for Success 
Scholars have identified eight benefits of the PFS model.  First, the PFS 
model enhances each program’s potential to deliver the best possible services 
to the communities it serves by focusing stakeholders on the same primary 
social objective and outcome, whether that be reducing recidivism, 
increasing educational opportunities, providing jobs, or another goal.278  This 
approach is a departure from the traditional funding model (such as grants) 
that focuses on outputs or services delivered, as opposed to outcomes or 
results.279  PFS models may help facilitate “a larger movement to create a 
more performance-based social sector.”280 
Second, this model “facilitate[s] spending on upfront prevention, reducing 
the need for downstream remediation expenditures.”281  Government 
spending is typically constrained by the limitations of the budgeting process.  
Most spending is typically done on “crisis-driven services” to generate 
results that can come to fruition within the fiscal year.282  However, by 
allowing the government to transfer the risk of a prevention program to 
private investors and away from taxpayers, the government can “support 
prevention without the fear that they will pay the cost and not reap the 
reward.”283  Thus, the government and taxpayers pay for results only, and 
                                                                                                                 
 276. See id. 
 277. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 5 (“If a PFS project does not achieve its intended 
outcomes, government doesn’t spend any money.  If a project is successful, however, 
investors are repaid principal and modest rates of return relative to the risk of financing social 
outcomes.  The return a government pays is, in essence, a premium for not bearing the upfront 
full cost- and risk- of achieving positive social outcomes.  The alternative to paying this 
interest ‘premium’ is risking all of government’s funding upfront on projects that may or may 
not work.”). 
 278. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 3; see also Liang et al., supra note 256, at 272 (“This 
financial incentive gives investors a reason to take more of an interest in how effectively a 
program is run and which interventions are used.  They will require that quality controls be 
implemented and that service providers are chosen based on their program model, 
supervision, and management team rather than their political ties.”). 
 279. Leventhal, supra note 268, at 528. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 523; see also Cox, supra note 256, at 968 (“The SIB structure redirects money 
from safety-net programs to more effective early-intervention programs.”). 
 282. Leventhal, supra note 268, at 523. 
 283. Id. at 525; see also id. at 524 n.33. 
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serious problems that require more long-term solutions can actually be 
addressed.284 
Third, the PFS model allows for, and even encourages, innovation.285  PFS 
programs can operate as “pilot programs” and allow the government to 
partner with riskier projects that can yield a higher reward, all at the 
investors’ expense, not at the tax-payers’.286  If a program is successful, the 
government has the option to adopt that program and expand it to benefit a 
larger population.287  This innovation can facilitate collaboration across 
organizations.  If service providers were funded together, as opposed to 
independently on similar goals, such collaboration could yield positive 
outcomes for multifaceted problems.288 
Fourth, the PFS model can create more accountability289 and transparency 
and lead to superior programs in general.290  Data collection is integral since 
the programs are based upon outcomes and results.  Governments will be 
encouraged to “improve their data collection processes by integrating data 
systems” which will lead to an increased understanding of “how underserved 
populations interact with government systems.”291  Put another way, the data 
collected by these social service providers and used to assess the success of 
the program, can also be used by the government to understand more 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 1. 
 285. See Liang et al., supra note 256, at 273; see also John K. Roman, et al., Five Steps to 
Pay for Success:  Implementing Pay for Success Projects in the Juvenile and Criminal Justice 
Systems, URB. INST. 14 (June 2014) (“The focus on developing and using evidence- based 
social programs may also spur innovation in the social sector as programs compete and are 
adopted based on the strength of their evidence and track records of success.”). 
 286. See Hanna Azemati et al., Social Impact Bonds:  Lessons Learned so Far, 9 CMTY. 
INV. REV. ISSUE 27 (2013) (“[T]he interventions being tested in most of the initial SIB projects 
are riskier, more innovative, and offer more potential learning benefits than we had 
anticipated.”).  On the other hand, PFS can be used to scale up proven programs. See Liang 
et al., supra note 256, at 273. 
 287. See Kristina Costa & Sonal Shah, Government’s Role in Pay for Success, 9 CMTY. 
INV. REV. ISSUE 91 (2013) (“For government agencies at all levels, PFS mechanisms create 
opportunities for the public sector to reward “what works” or expand access to evidence based 
preventive social interventions without requiring taxpayers to shoulder all of the financial risk 
upfront.”). 
 288. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 528 (“If instead both the mental health provider and 
the shelter provider were funded together to achieve an outcome, they would have to 
acknowledge the multi-faceted nature of the problem and work closely together to address the 
underlying challenges.”); see also Cox, supra note 256, at 969 (“Outcome contracting through 
an intermediary allows “organizations . . . to join forces with other organizations to provide a 
tailored service that answer[s] the needs of their clients most effectively.”). 
 289. See Oertel et al., supra note 262, at 696 (“With everyone from individuals to 
governments and foundations calling for increased accountability, it is not surprising that 
donors are looking for objective means to assure that the funds they have given have achieved 
the intended outcomes.”). 
 290. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 526. 
 291. Id. 
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thoroughly the extent and intensity of social problems.  Through greater data 
collection and analysis, governments will be able to create services that are 
more attuned to community and societal needs.292 
Fifth, PFS has the ability to unlock “new service delivery potentials.”293  
Because outcomes are contracted for, programs can be adapted “on the fly” 
to achieve the targets.294  Social service providers—and other parties295—
will be driven to discover more cost-effective ways of achieving the targeted 
outcomes.296  This does not just benefit the stakeholders in the PFS program, 
but also benefits philanthropists.  Because of the model’s focus on outcomes, 
it will reduce expenses generated by ineffective programming, thus allowing 
philanthropists to be more judicious and fund innovation.297 
Sixth, the PFS model enables a stable, multiyear revenue stream to service 
providers.298  The financial burden to provide the upfront funds is not born 
by the government or non-profit service providers.299  Typically, many non-
profits struggle with funding and resources, and as a result must devote 
substantial amounts of time and energy to finding financing as opposed to 
devoting their time to the social services they offer.300  By having upfront 
costs taken care of, non-profit service providers have the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See Justin Milner & Matthew Eldridge, From Evidence to Outcomes:  Using Evidence 
to Inform Pay for Success Project Design, URB. INST. 8 (May 2016), http://pfs.urban.org/
library/content/evidence-outcomes-using-evidence-inform-pay-success-project-design 
[https://perma.cc/Z85A-KRCG] (“Using evidence to make public welfare decisions improves 
government effectiveness and drives better outcomes for society.  Pay for success can be on 
the front line of that change, helping improve the use and availability of evidence by making 
stakeholders consumers and generators of evidence.”). 
 293. Cox, supra note 256, at 969. 
 294. Id.; PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 3 (explaining service providers can “course correct” 
as needed to achieve the target goals). 
 295. See Liang et al., supra note 256, at 272 (“[I]nherent within the model is a strong 
incentive for all parties to pursue performance and cost efficiency in achieving the program 
goals.”). 
 296. Emily Bolton & Louise Savell, Towards a New Social Economy:  Blended Value 
Creation Through Social Impact Bonds, SOC. FIN. 3 (Mar. 2010), http://www.social
finance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Towards-A-New-Social-Economy-web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P9RP-9DUW]. 
 297. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 525. 
 298. See id. at 527. 
 299. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 1 (explaining that “Private investors—commercial 
and philanthropic—provide the upfront capital needed” through SIBs). 
 300. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 527; see also Cox, supra note 256, at 970 
(“Admittedly, SIB structures are not a panacea for every social problem, but—where viable—
they present many advantages over traditional grant and appropriation financing.”). 
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“think strategically about robust scaling efforts and to focus their energy on 
providing excellent services.”301 
Seventh, the PFS model expands access to a market previously 
unavailable to non-profits.302  Traditionally service providers rely on 
foundation assets provided by philanthropists.303  That pool of money is 
roughly seven hundred billion dollars.304  The PFS model creates an asset 
that investors can invest in.305  The amount of money then available to 
finance these programs is dramatically increased:  “there are some $200 
trillion of financial assets; creating a pipeline from social outcomes to these 
$200 trillion forms a pathway to a new world where social entrepreneurs can 
get the capital they need to scale critical services and where people in need 
have access to services they require.”306 
Eighth, this model also benefits investors in two ways:  (1) investors can 
gain a financial return while achieving a social impact—investors make 
money by utilizing their portfolio for a greater social benefit; and (2) 
investors now have access to new assets that are not connected to other 
investments, thereby spreading their risk.  Since returns are linked to social 
outcomes, not traditional investment benchmarks, investors can diversify 
their risk in their portfolios by social impact investing, “rather than 
compound any one set of risks.”307 
3. The Risks of Pay for Success 
The PFS model it is not without risks.  Risks stem from the fact that PFS 
utilizes SIBs that are “a complicated, multi-party and cross-sector financial 
instrument, which is still in its infancy stage today.”308  Scholar Deborah 
Burand has grouped the risks of the PFS model into the following categories:  
                                                                                                                 
 301. Leventhal, supra note 268, at 528; see also Cox, supra note 256, at 970 (“Multi-year 
contracts allow service providers to do more service providing and less time consuming 
fundraising.”). 
 302. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 529 (“By monetizing social outcomes, Social Impact 
Bonds create an asset that investors can invest in, expanding the pot of money available 
beyond philanthropy and government grants to true investment capital.”). 
 303. See id. at 528; see also Toussaint, supra note 67, at 78 (explaining that, alternative 
funding is “especially important during an era of government austerity at both the state and 
local levels”). 
 304. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 529. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See id.; see also Sir Ronald Cohen & William A. Sahlman, Social Impact Investing 
Will Be the New Venture Capital, HBR BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/
cs/2013/01/social_impact_investing_will_b.html [https://perma.cc/6FEH-MF5Q]. 
 307. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 527, 527 n.44. 
 308. See Liang et al., supra note 256, at 273. 
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(1) intervention model risk; (2) execution risk; (3) intermediary risk; (4) 
political risk; (5) financial risk; and (6) reputational risk.309 
Intervention model risk is the possibility that the outcomes expected are 
not produced.310  One way to mitigate this risk is to rely on proven models.311  
However, this may make funding harder to obtain for smaller fledgling non-
profits with new and untested ideas.312  One way to reduce intervention 
model risk is to ensure that appropriate metrics are:  (1) used to provide 
feedback on the progress of the program; and (2) are correlated strongly with 
the expected financial benefit of the program.313 
Execution risk is created by performance challenges that are specific to 
the structure of a given model.314  First, social providers that have been 
selected for programs may “prove to be weak or otherwise unable to scale 
the intervention as expected.”315  Second, a badly executed program can 
“wreak havoc on the very populations that the SIB is meant to serve.”316  
Third, there is a risk that social service providers may take “inappropriate 
actions” such as withholding information that shows a program may not 
reach its targets or, at worst, falsifying information to meet the targets.317  
However, there are several ways the government can mitigate these risks.318  
For example, the government can require due diligence to mitigate this 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See Burand, supra note 271, at 467. 
 310. See id. at 468. 
 311. See id. 
 312. See Rick Cohen, Eight Sobering Thoughts for Social Impact Bond Supporters, 
NONPROFIT Q. (June 12, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/06/12/eight-sobering-
thoughts-for-social-impact-bond-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/LH6T-EXPP]. 
 313. Liang et al., supra note 256, at 274. 
 314. See Burand, supra note 271, at 469. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 469 (explaining that if players give up on the programs when and if they do not 
reach their targets prematurely, this runs a “shut down” risk whereby those social services 
once provided on a smaller scale are no longer operational). 
 317. Id. at 470 (“For example, a social service provider participating in a SIB aimed at 
reducing the number of children residing in foster care might start returning children to 
dangerous family situations without sufficient regard for the children’s safety.  Or a social 
service provider participating in a SIB aimed at prisoner recidivism might interfere with legal 
processes to ensure that reconviction rates are delayed or inappropriately frustrated during 
periods when SIB reconviction targets are to be measured.”); see also PFS FAQ, supra note 
256, at 7 (discussing skimming dangers:  programs may be biased in their selection of program 
participants—those who are more statistically likely to achieve the positive outcomes needed 
to achieve targets so investors are repaid.  This can disadvantage groups who are in the most 
need of these kind of social programs in the first place.). 
 318. See Burand, supra note 271, at 472 (Investors can also help to mitigate these risks “1) 
before an investment, through their decisions about whether to invest in a particular SIB 
(including due diligence as to the SIB intermediary, the likely social service providers, and 
their potential fellow SIB investors) and 2) once invested, through the influence they exert on 
the governance of the SIB intermediary.”). 
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risk.319  The government can also include certain contractual provisions that 
allow it to terminate or replace social service providers who act 
inappropriately.320  The government can also support independent watchdog 
organizations, distinct from the independent evaluator, that ensure the 
protection of vulnerable populations by providing independent oversight of 
PFS programs.321 
Intermediary risk is the risk that the intermediary will not perform its 
obligations and thus thwart the financial and social goals of the program.322  
Since this is such a new model, intermediaries that lack experience may fail 
to manage the project well.323  Additionally, if their role as intermediary is 
not their primary job, they also may not have the time necessary to 
adequately manage a project.324  One way to mitigate this risk would be to 
develop best practices for intermediaries.325 
Political risk refers to “both the capacity and the will of the host 
government to undertake its obligations.”326  Government entrenchment can 
result in an unwillingness to participate in PFS programs.327  Also, since 
government officials change, new administrations may not adhere to former 
obligations.328  Further, if a government has limited experience, this political 
risk is exacerbated.329  For example, some programs may be priced too 
highly, and an inexperienced government may not recognize this.330  Thus, 
government commitment331 and executive leadership within government are 
often critically important to a program’s success.332  Additionally, some 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Presumably this due diligence would be undertaken by the government before the 
contract is entered into in order to assess the staff training, codes of conduct, financial 
incentive schemes, and reputation of social service provider. See id. at 471. 
 320. See id. 
 321. See id. at 471-72. 
 322. See id. at 472. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See id. 
 325. See id. at 473 (“Drawing on such practices should also help reduce the risk of SIB 
intermediary failure.  Similarly, as more organizations gain experience in SIB intermediation, 
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 327. See id. at 475. 
 328. See id.  For example, some states may require special legislation to allow for PFS 
contracting.  If one administration makes this promise and is then replaced with another 
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 329. See id. at 473. 
 330. See id. at 474. 
 331. See Cox, supra note 256, at 979 (“The problem of multi-year contracting is solved by 
pledging the government’s full faith and credit to multi-year commitments.”). 
 332. See Burand, supra note 271, at 475. 
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programs may require the adoption of legislation to ensure the government 
is bound to a long term PFS contract.333 
Financial risks are largely born by the investors.334  First, the investor’s 
money is often locked up in the model for years:  “investors must be willing 
to tolerate high liquidity risk since the duration of a bond is anywhere from 
3 to 10 years with no early termination.”335  Transaction and monitoring costs 
in the early stages of PFS models may be incredibly high.336  Once these PFS 
contracts become more standardized, the transaction costs will likely lower 
at least moderately.337  Moreover, there are some risk-mitigation methods 
that can “be applied to the social impact bond structure, such as reserve 
funds, first-loss provisions, and other credit enhancing methods.”338  Also 
the government can explore tax solutions to encourage investors to 
participate in this type of financing.339 
Reputational risks affect all players; however, service providers bear the 
brunt of this risk if targets are not met.340  The reputational risk also extends 
to PFS programs in general.  If some programs prove to be unsuccessful due 
to any of the aforementioned risks, governments may shy away from using 
this model to address other societal problems.341 
There are also several general concerns with the PFS model.  First, 
because it is still a new innovation in the United States, it is difficult to 
predict whether this model will become more popular or if it will stagnate.342  
Second, there is a risk that if PFS programs become more mainstream, they 
                                                                                                                 
 333. See Cox, supra note 256, at 979 (“Typical appropriations statutes are often unable to 
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will cannibalize funding from non-profits who do not participate.343  Third, 
not all social goods are easily quantifiable.  This model may be limited to 
only those programs that can be easily measured and monetized, creating the 
unintended effect of ignoring some of the more challenging social ills.344  
Additionally, there is a risk that the programs funded will rely on 
oversimplified models that “obscure the true scope of the costs, benefits, and 
savings to local communities.”345  Fourth, monetizing social progress may 
lead to favoring local incrementalism in lieu of broad based reform.346  Fifth, 
others argue that PFS models risk privatizing the public sector, and instead 
we should “consider a simpler solution—public investments in schools, jobs, 
social programs and innovate criminal justice.”347 
4. Federal and State Support for Pay for Success 
The 2016 federal budget invests seventy million dollars in the Social 
Innovation Fund (“SIF”), housed under the Corporation for National and 
Community Service (“CNCS”), and proposes twenty percent be available for 
PFS projects.348  Importantly, the Senate Appropriations Committee 
submitted a draft of the 2017 budget to the Senate floor that defunds SIF.349  
Conversely, the House Appropriations Committee submitted a budget that 
provides fifty million dollars to SIF with a twenty percent set aside for pay 
for success.350  In April 2016, CNCS announced twenty-five SIB PFS 
competition sub-awards, and over the summer, announced three more 
grantees.351 
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evidence-based-policy-junejuly-2016/ [https://perma.cc/R4CN-JHGB]. 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. 
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During fiscal year 2014/2015, Congress authorized the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) to provide funds to implement Permanent Supportive 
Housing for those cycling in and out of the criminal justice system and 
homeless services.352  HUD and DOJ awarded a total of $8.7 million in 
grants to different entities that focus on using the PFS model to address 
homelessness and reduce recidivism.353 
In addition to these budgetary measures, Congress appears to be in favor 
of aspects of the PFS model.  In March 2016, Congress passed the Evidence-
Based Policymaking Commission Act, which established a commission to 
develop practices that will ensure evidence and outcomes are used to decide 
federal policy and budget proposals.354  The commission is tasked with 
exploring how to use federal data sources in a more useful way for analysis 
and research, how to connect data sets, examine infrastructure necessary to 
make data more accessible to researchers, provide recommendations as to 
how to evaluate program designs, and how to protect security and privacy.355 
In June 2016, the House introduced and passed the Social Impact 
Partnerships to Pay for Results Act.356  The Senate version has been 
introduced and referred to the Committee on Finance.357  Both versions of 
this Act would “direct federal resources to states and local communities to 
support innovative Pay for Success feasibility studies, evaluations, and end 
payment structures.”358 
Over thirty states have embarked on some exploration of PFS 
programs.359  Several states have set aside funding in their budgets for PFS 
programs;360 a number of states enacted or introduced legislation to fund PFS 
                                                                                                                 
 352. See id. 
 353. See id. (“The seven grantees are:  Corporation for Supportive Housing, Third Sector 
Capital Partners, United Way of Anchorage, Rhode Island Coalition for the Homeless, 
University of Utah, American Institutes of Research, and Ending Community Homelessness 
Coalition.”). 
 354. See id.; see also Public Law No: 114-140. 
 355. See Public Law No: 114-140. 
 356. See H.R. 5170; Truhe, supra note 349; CONG. RES. SERV., SUMMARY: H.R. 5170, 
[hereinafter CRS SUMMARY] https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5170 
[https://perma.cc/9SXX_JDN2] (explaining that this is a reworked version of the “Social 
Impact Partnership Act” (H.R. 1336/S. 1089) which was introduced in both houses earlier). 
 357. See Truhe, supra note 349 (“The Senate is now considering whether to take up the 
new House version of the bill, which includes a one-year reauthorization of TANF and a pay 
for or funding offset, or to try and move their bill in which case they still need to find a way 
to fund the bill and a legislative vehicle to move the bill forward.”); CRS SUMMARY, supra 
note 356. 
 358. Truhe, supra note 349. 
 359. See NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, supra note 270. 
 360. New York and Massachusetts. See id. 
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programs and contracts generally;361 several others have initiated on PFS 
studies;362 and others have introduced PFS funding for specific purposes 
such as education and reducing recidivism.363 
5. New York’s Recidivism Pay for Success Program and Massachusetts’ 
Homelessness Pay for Success Program 
The Nonprofit Finance Fund conducted a review of the first ten PFS 
projects in the United States.364  Of those ten, three focused on recidivism365 
and three focused on homelessness generally.366  This Section will examine 
and compare two of these programs:  NYC ABLE Project for Incarcerated 
Youth and Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness Pay for Success Initiative. 
NYC ABLE is the only project that has come to completion.367  This 
program’s objective was to reduce recidivism of male adolescents 
incarcerated at Rikers Island by at least ten percent using cognitive 
behavioral therapy to improve personal responsibility and decision 
making.368  This was a transplanted project, meaning it was modeled on 
programs from other locations and service providers.369  It was designed as 
a four-year project but provided the investor with a choice to continue 
                                                                                                                 
 361. General legislation has passed or been introduced in California, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, and Washington; contract legislation passed or introduced in Colorado, 
Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of Columbia. See id. 
 362. Legislation has been passed or introduced in Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, and Vermont. 
See id. 
 363. Legislation has been passed or introduced in Colorado, Idaho, New Hampshire, and 
Oklahoma. See id. 
 364. See NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, Pay for Success:  The First Generation (April 2016), 
[hereinafter The First Generation] http://www.payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/resource-
files/Pay%20for%20Success_The%20First%20Generation_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPB6-
8WLY]. 
 365. See id. at 4.  NYC ABLE Project for Incarcerated Youth, launched in 2012; Increasing 
Employment and Improving Public Safety, launched in 2013; and Massachusetts Juvenile 
Justice PFS Initiative, launched in 2014. See id. 
 366. See id.  Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness Pay for Success Initiative, launched in 
2014; Project Welcome Home, launched in 2015; and Housing to Heath Initiative, launched 
in 2016. See id. 
 367. See id. at 25.  The initial investment was $9.6 million, the return to investors ranged 
from eleven to twenty-two percent, the service providers were Friends of Island Academy and 
the Osborne Association, and the back-payor was the NYC Department of Corrections. See 
id. at 25. 
 368. Program Summary–ABLE, NYC YOUNG MEN’S INITIATIVE, CTR. FOR ECON. 
OPPORTUNITY (2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/able_fy13q3_update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2WG-37EK]; see id. at 4; see also Fact Sheet:  The NYC ABLE Project 
for Incarcerated Youth, (Aug. 2, 2012) http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/sib_
fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8SF-8P5C] (“[This] program aims to reduce the 
reincarceration rate among adolescents at Rikers Island through an evidenced-based 
intervention that focuses on improving personal responsibility and decision-making.”). 
 369. See The First Generation, supra note 364, at 4, 7. 
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funding the program for a fourth year based on the first year participants’ 
results after a two-year evaluation period.370  This initial evaluation did not 
show an impact on the recidivism rate, so the program was terminated after 
the third year.371  The other programs that have not yet been completed offer 
the first initial repayment in 2017.372 
One program in particular caught the attention of the press:373  the 
Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness Pay for Success Initiative.374  This 
program was initiated to address the 1500 chronically homeless people in the 
state who lack access to stable housing and, as a result, use temporary 
shelters, Medicaid, and emergency services at a high-cost to the state.375  The 
project intended to improve health, end homelessness, and increase personal 
stability by achieving one year of housing stability.376  The goal of the 
program, designed to run for six years, is to provide at minimum five 
hundred supportive housing units to up to eight hundred program 
participants.377  While the program is not yet complete, in its first year it 
surpassed its minimum goal and successfully housed over 250 individuals in 
supportive housing.378 
                                                                                                                 
 370. Id. at 5. 
 371. See id.  The outcomes tied to payments were:  (1) the number of people served by the 
program, and (2) the total days of jail avoided. See id. at 16.  Bloomberg Philanthropies acted 
as the guarantor, and guaranteed $7.2 million. See id. at 25.  Thus, Goldman Sachs only 
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 372. See id. at 30.  One program, Project Welcome Home, offers repayment annually. 
 373. See, e.g., Deborah De Santis, MA Pay for Success Worth Watching, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-de-santis/ma-pay-for-success-
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 374. See The First Generation, supra note 364, at 25.  The initial investment was for $3.5 
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Merrimak Valley). See id.  The investors will receive an interest rate that is calculated based 
on the level of success of the program and paid annually starting at the end of the second year 
of the program. See id. at 31 n.5.  The service provider is the Massachusetts Housing and 
Shelter Alliance. See id. at 8.  The back-payor is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and 
the Project manager is the Massachusetts Alliance for Supportive Housing. See id. 
 375. See id. at 4.  While there is an overlap in the homeless population and the formerly 
incarcerated population, this program focuses on the chronically homelessness.  Formerly 
incarcerated people who are also homeless may benefit from these programs, but the program 
does not exclusively target that population. See id. 
 376. See id. at 16.  The outcome tied to payments is that stable housing is achieved for at 
least one year. 
 377. See id. at 4. 
 378. See Pay for Success 2016 Fact Sheet, MASS. HOUS. & SHELTER ALL. (Oct. 2016), 
http://www.mhsa.net/sites/default/files/PFS%20Fact%20Sheet%20October%202016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/86LG-QN8T]; Press Release:  Pay for Success Initiative to Reduce Chronic 
Individual Homelessness Successfully Houses over 250 Individuals in the First Year, MASS. 
HOUS. & SHELTER ALL. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.mhsa.net/news/pay-for-success-initiative-
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The failure of the NYC program compared to the success of the 
Massachusetts program is attributable to differences in the financing, 
structure, and design of the two programs.    
The NYC and Massachusetts programs were financed very differently.  
The investment in the NYC program by Goldman Sachs was guaranteed by 
the Bloomberg Philanthropies for up to $7.2 million,379 whereas the investors 
in the Massachusetts program have no such guarantee.380  Also, the NYC 
program only had one investor whereas the Massachusetts program has three 
investors and was partly funded by grant money.381  Presumably, the cost 
and efficacy of monitoring would be less for each individual investor in the 
Massachusetts program than Goldman Sachs as a single investor.  Moreover, 
one can speculate that Goldman Sachs as a single investor with a substantial 
guarantee may not have monitored the program as rigorously as compared 
to the multiple investors in the Massachusetts program with no guarantee. 
Additionally, the NYC and Massachusetts programs were designed very 
differently.  The NYC program was a transplanted design to help assist a 
very high-risk population, unlike the Massachusetts program, which is a 
scaling project designed to help the chronically homeless.382  First, the two 
program’s target populations could be one factor that inhibited success:  
while both populations are in need, juveniles in Rikers are a particularly 
high-risk population.383  Second, using a transplanted design is inherently 
riskier than scaling up a proven model for a target population.384  Thus, the 
NYC program’s lack of success in meeting its targets may be because the 
program was inherently risky.385  In addition, the Massachusetts program is 
set to run for a longer period of time than the NYC program.  It is possible 
that the targets set in the NYC program may have been unrealistic or 
unachievable within the shorter time frame.  Further, the NYC program was 
                                                                                                                 
to-reduce-chronic-individual-homelessness-successfully-houses-over-250-individuals-in-
first-year [https://perma.cc/BQL7-DVFC]. 
 379. See The First Generation, supra note 364, at 25. 
 380. See id. 
 381. See id. 
 382. See id. at 12. 
 383. See MDRC Statement on the Vera Institute’s Study of the Adolescent Behavioral 
Learning Experience (ABLE) Program at Rikers Island, MDRC (July 2015), [hereinafter 
MDRC Statement] http://www.mdrc.org/news/announcement/mdrc-statement-vera-institute-
s-study-adolescent-behavioral-learning-experience [https://perma.cc/37W8-3B2Q] (NYC 
ABLE was designed “to tackle one of New York City’s most challenging problems—
recidivism among adolescents incarcerated at Rikers Island.  All of the parties understood that 
it was a high risk undertaking.”). 
 384. See Burand, supra note 271, at 468. 
 385. See, e.g., MDRC Statement, supra note 383 (“As described in MDRC’s 2013 report, 
the implementation of ABLE faced a number of challenges, including reaching adolescents 
who did not attend the Rikers school and the indeterminate lengths of stay for many of the 
young people.”). 
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a cognitive behavioral therapy program, and as such, it may have been hard 
to value the positive effects of this program through the chosen metrics of 
measurement. 
Instead of viewing the NYC program as a failure, we should learn from 
it.386  Despite the fact that the NYC program did not meet its targets, it may 
have lasting positive effects at Rikers Island.  The program was unique 
because it “attempted to change part of the culture in Rikers Island by 
introducing an intervention for a very high-needs population for whom little 
to no programming was previously offered.”387  It encouraged Rikers 
management and non-uniform staff to participate and work closely with the 
service provider, which could result in a positive cultural change among the 
staff that benefits the incarcerated population.388  Moreover, the program did 
in fact have some measurable positive impacts on the sixteen to eighteen year 
old population:  in 2013, eighty-seven percent of those held for more than 
six days attended at least one ABLE session, and “44 percent reached a 
programmatic milestone found in prior studies to be associated with positive 
outcomes.”389 
6. Proven Models:  Non-Profits that Address Housing Issues of Formerly 
Incarcerated People in New York 
There are several non-profit organizations that assist formerly 
incarcerated people with accessing safe, secure, affordable housing.  This 
Note highlights three:  the Fortune Society, the Osborne Association, and 
Community Access.  These non-profits and their housing programs can be 
candidates for future PFS projects. 
The Fortune Society provides a multitude of comprehensive services to 
formerly incarcerated people, including “low-threshold access to supportive 
emergency, phased-permanent, and permanent housing.”390  Their 
emergency shelter service offers sixty-two beds.391  While residing there, 
residents spend thirty-five hours per week doing productive activities, 
undergo daily drug screening, and participate in morning and evening 
support groups along with other supportive services.392  Within one year, 
these residents are transitioned to supportive-permanent housing or other 
                                                                                                                 
 386. See Cohen & Zelnick, supra note 347. 
 387. MDRC Statement, supra note 383. 
 388. See id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Housing, FORTUNE SOC’Y (Sept. 7, 2013), http://fortunesociety.org/programs/housing 
[https://perma.cc/RFX5-AA5N]. 
 391. See Ross, supra note 114. 
 392. See The Fortune Academy at a Glance 2013-2015, FORTUNE SOC’Y (on file with 
author) [hereinafter At A Glance]. 
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adequate housing placement.393  These programs have had great success 
housing the formerly incarcerated in permanent housing.394 
The Osborne Association also provides many services, including its 
Housing Placement and Assistance (“HPA”) program.395  This program 
provides independent, supportive, and transitional housing options, in 
addition to Home Start-Up Kits and rental assistance.396  Additionally, it 
offers housing retention activities that are available to participants for the 
first year following release.397  The Osborne Association offers two 
supportive services:  Safety Counts and Project HIRE.  Safety Counts helps 
high risk drug users correct their behavior and partners with Project Street 
Beat to provide on-site HIV/HVC testing.398  The program is offered in 
English and Spanish.399 
Community Access is a supportive housing provider that first pioneered 
the integrated housing model in the mid 1970s to provide affordable housing 
to low income families, veterans, youth aging out of foster care, and 
individuals with psychiatric disabilities.400  They have developed over 
twenty affordable housing projects in New York City.401  They offer 
supportive services for mental and physical health, employment, education, 
and substance use.402 
These proven models could be promising candidates for scaling up using 
the PFS financing structure so that they reach a larger population of formerly 
incarcerated people and help them obtain safe, stable, and affordable 
housing. 
                                                                                                                 
 393. See Ross, supra note 114; At a Glance, supra note 392. 
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III.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE:   STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF PAY FOR SUCCESS PROGRAMS 
FOR FORMERLY INCARCERATED PEOPLE 
In order to ensure that formerly incarcerated people can access safe, 
affordable, and stable housing, states should first, continue to experiment 
with the PFS model and second, invest in programs that address the housing 
needs of the formerly incarcerated who reside in their states.  While this Note 
advocates for the use of PFS to address the needs of this population, it does 
not ignore the legitimate fear of many in the public sector that PFS programs 
will eventually privatize the public sector.403  Ideally, the government should 
be making more public investments to assist the formerly incarcerated; a 
population comprised of predominately people of color who are, in many 
cases, initially victims of a racialized criminal justice system and 
subsequently, victims of severe discrimination in housing.  However, in a 
time in which local government budgets are constrained, and the President 
proposes reducing HUD’s budget by six billion dollars404 and slashing 
funding for many other administrative agencies responsible for a variety of 
social programs that states rely on,405 it is unlikely such a plea to state and 
local governments to invest in public programs for formerly incarcerated 
people will be successful.  To truly address this issue, it is critical to explore 
new and creative funding mechanisms that may be more attractive to local 
governments in a time of fiscal austerity.  Moreover, the current litigation 
regime, standing alone, is simply deficient to combat instances of 
discrimination formerly incarcerated people face.  PFS is not a panacea to 
replace public spending on all social ills.  But in the interest of justice for the 
formerly incarcerated, we should strive for substance over form. 
                                                                                                                 
 403. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
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The current litigation regime bars access to justice for many formerly 
incarcerated people who face housing discrimination.  Formerly incarcerated 
litigants must bring their own FHA claims under the disparate impact theory 
to attempt to secure safe, stable, and affordable housing.  Those who do bring 
claims have had limited success in the past, and the more stringent pleading 
requirements from Texas v. Inclusive Communities, make future success 
even less likely.406  Litigation is slow, time consuming, expensive, and places 
a heavy burden on those already disadvantaged to bring these claims.407  
More significantly, disparate impact litigation cannot combat the massive 
volume of discrimination that occurs every single year.408  Additionally, 
given the current political landscape, it is unlikely President Trump or 
Congress will support any reforms to increase the likelihood of success of 
disparate impact litigation.409  For example, current HUD Secretary Ben 
Carson previously accused HUD of “social engineering” when the agency 
announced that state and local governments that received federal funding for 
housing must build affordable units in wealthier, healthier neighborhoods 
and not solely poor neighborhoods.410  Some fear Secretary Carson will send 
a message to states that “it is again perfectly fine for governments around the 
country to return to a policy of racial isolation.”411  It is also equally unlikely 
that a protected class of formerly incarcerated people will be established, and 
even if it were, similar litigation challenges would apply.412  Thus, if reform 
is to occur it must be undertaken by states and reach beyond litigation. 
The potential social benefits of the PFS models outweigh the potential 
risks—if PFS programs for the formerly incarcerated are structured 
responsibly, effectively, and with appropriate safeguards.  The structure of 
PFS increases the chances of achieving the best possible services for 
communities by focusing all stakeholders around achieving a social good;413 
                                                                                                                 
 406. See supra Section II.A. 
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 409. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Under Trump, Approach to Civil Rights Law is Likely to 
Change Definitively, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/
politics/civil-rights-justice-department-donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4VNA-WDKW] 
(describing Trump’s pick for Attorney General, Jeff Sessions’ views on civil rights litigation 
and discrimination.  During Session’s confirmation hearing, when asked about prosecuting 
sex and gender discrimination cases at the federal level, Sessions is quoted saying “I am not 
sure women or people with different sexual orientations face that kind of discrimination.  I 
just don’t see it.”). 
 410. See Carson, supra note 23. 
 411. See The Editorial Board, Ben Carson’s Warped View of Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/opinion/ben-carsons-warped-view-of-hou
sing.html [https://perma.cc/WPL6-G3GV]. 
 412. See supra Section II.B. 
 413. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. 
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PFS will support prevention programs and only spend tax payer dollars on 
positive social outcomes;414 it will allow for more creative collaboration and 
innovation;415 it will vastly expand data collection and transparency, 
allowing government to continue to create more effective programs that 
address actual community needs;416 it will encourage cost-effective ways to 
achieve social good;417 it will provide financial stability to service 
providers;418 and it will expand the market available to finance non-profits 
doing good work.419  While there are risks, the government can mitigate 
many by relying on proven models;420 ensuring metrics are appropriate;421 
conducting due diligence;422 agreeing to termination terms in contracts to 
curb bad behavior;423 supporting watch dog organizations;424 creating best 
practices for intermediaries;425 and setting aside budget dollars and creating 
legislation to ensure the duration of PFS contracts.426  Moreover, any 
instances of early failure offer learning opportunities to enable better 
designed and successful future programs, and even then, less measurable but 
positive effects can still result.427 
States should take this opportunity to invest in PFS programs specifically 
designed to help formerly incarcerated people access stable, affordable 
housing by dedicating state budget dollars to these programs, and investing 
based on need.  For example, states can work within the flexible PFS 
framework to allocate funding using government data sets to examine how 
many released persons annually lack stable homes to re-enter, and how many 
would benefit from housing with supportive services for drug addiction and 
mental health.  They can then allocate funds accordingly, using proven 
models to further mitigate risk.  If contracts are written to encourage 
collaboration between service providers, then there will be a steady stream 
of funding that can be adjusted annually based on the needs of the annual 
outgoing prison population.  Each year, the data sets will grow, allowing 
programs to be better tailored to population needs.  Moreover, the funding 
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will come from private investors, and tax payers will only have to pay for 
successful outcomes so there will not be an additional strain on state budgets.  
Successful housing programs for formerly incarcerated people that reduce 
recidivism will also reduce state expenditures on recidivism, resulting in an 
aggregated cost savings in budgetary dollars.  Therefore, since the state will 
only be responsible for paying for successful outcomes, PFS provides states 
with a great opportunity to help not only those who are high risk, but to 
engage in preventative measures to assist first time offenders and stop the 
cycle of poverty and recidivism before it can begin. 
States can also set outcome targets that are tailored to each specific 
program and need.  For example, for those struggling with drug addiction, a 
metric of success could be six months of stable housing and sobriety.  
Particularly when implementing scaled up versions of proven non-profit 
models, states can set reasonable and achievable targets by looking to the 
metrics non-profits use to measure their own success.  Likewise, states may 
also experiment with different targets that may be more effective at 
illustrating results and success.  Moreover, states can even collect data 
through PFS on other related and important metrics.  For instance, a program 
that helps those struggling with drug addiction can also collect information 
on the number and cost of emergency room visits of those participating in 
the program.  Thus, states can not only help individuals, but can also collect 
data related to important state services that are otherwise difficult to 
ascertain. 
CONCLUSION 
Hundreds of thousands of individuals are released from prison annually 
and face a host of barriers to securing housing upon their reentry.  Housing 
is the key to successful re-entry.  Without housing, everything else falls 
apart.  States can not only save budget dollars by reducing recidivism 
through securing safe housing for formerly incarcerated people, but also can 
help whole communities and provide meaningful second chances for many 
individuals. 
The current litigation regime is too limited to make any real systemic 
difference in society or to offer practical help to those being discriminated 
against due to their criminal histories.  State governments are currently 
facing a crisis of funding at the federal level, and are likely unwilling or 
unable to fund housing programs for the formerly incarcerated though 
traditional government public financing mechanisms.  The PFS model is a 
unique tool that would allow states to invest in programs that offer true 
second chances to formerly incarcerated people that begin with securing 
safe, stable, and affordable housing.  States have used this model to tackle 
issues that overlap with recidivism; however, few states have focused 
specifically on reducing recidivism with a primary focus on housing.  
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Responsibly designed, implemented, and operated PFS programs provide 
states with the unique opportunity to do just that. 
